fix(cortex-cli): prevent path traversal in github install --workflow-name

Fixes bounty issue #1578

The --workflow-name argument was used directly to construct file paths
without validation, allowing path traversal attacks like '../../../malicious'.
This fix sanitizes the workflow name using the existing sanitize_filename()
utility to remove path separators and traversal sequences before using it
in file path construction.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug in cortex-engine where the 'permissions'
variable was shadowed in a pattern match.

Author: factorydroid

cortex-cli/src/github_cmd.rs

@@ -107,10 +107,20 @@ impl GitHubCli {
 /// Install GitHub Actions workflow.
 async fn run_install(args: InstallArgs) -> Result<()> {
     use cortex_engine::github::{WorkflowConfig, generate_workflow};
+    use cortex_engine::security::sanitize_filename;
+
+    // Sanitize workflow name to prevent path traversal attacks
+    let sanitized_name = sanitize_filename(&args.workflow_name);
+    if sanitized_name.is_empty() {
+        bail!(
+            "Invalid workflow name: '{}' contains only invalid characters",
+            args.workflow_name
+        );
+    }
 
     let repo_path = args.path.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."));
     let workflows_dir = repo_path.join(".github").join("workflows");
-    let workflow_file = workflows_dir.join(format!("{}.yml", args.workflow_name));
+    let workflow_file = workflows_dir.join(format!("{}.yml", sanitized_name));
 
     // Check if workflow already exists
     if workflow_file.exists() && !args.force {
@@ -122,7 +132,7 @@ async fn run_install(args: InstallArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // Generate workflow configuration
     let config = WorkflowConfig {
-        name: args.workflow_name.clone(),
+        name: sanitized_name.clone(),
         pr_review: args.pr_review,
         issue_automation: args.issue_automation,
     };
@@ -145,7 +155,7 @@ async fn run_install(args: InstallArgs) -> Result<()> {
     println!("     Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions → New repository secret");
     println!();
     println!("  2. Commit and push the workflow file:");
-    println!("     git add .github/workflows/{}.yml", args.workflow_name);
+    println!("     git add .github/workflows/{}.yml", sanitized_name);
     println!("     git commit -m \"Add Cortex CI/CD automation\"");
     println!("     git push");
     println!();
@@ -578,6 +588,7 @@ struct InstallationStatus {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use cortex_engine::security::sanitize_filename;
 
     #[test]
     fn test_parse_cortex_command() {
@@ -594,4 +605,22 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(help.contains("/Cortex help"));
         assert!(help.contains("/Cortex review"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_workflow_name_sanitization() {
+        // Path traversal attempts should be sanitized
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("../../../malicious"), "malicious");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("..\\..\\malicious"), "malicious");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("foo/bar"), "foobar");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("foo\\bar"), "foobar");
+
+        // Normal names should pass through
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("Cortex"), "Cortex");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("my-workflow"), "my-workflow");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("workflow_test"), "workflow_test");
+
+        // Leading dots should be removed
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename(".hidden"), "hidden");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_filename("...dots"), "dots");
+    }
 }

cortex-engine/src/tasks/snapshot.rs

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ impl SnapshotManager {
             match state {
                 FileState::Exists {
                     content,
-                    permissions: _,
+                    permissions,
                     ..
                 } => {
                     // Create parent directories