Summary: An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources.
Tactic: TA06 Develop Content
Parent Technique: T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
|---|
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|---|---|
| I00079 Three thousand fake tanks | “Two accounts [in the second network of accounts taken down by Twitter] appear to have been operated by Oriental Review and the Strategic Culture Foundation, respectively. Oriental Review bills itself as an “open source site for free thinking”, though it trades in outlandish conspiracy theories and posts content bylined by fake people. Stanford Internet Observatory researchers and investigative journalists have previously noted the presence of content bylined by fake “reporter” personas tied to the GRU-linked front Inside Syria Media Center, posted on Oriental Review.” In an effort to make the Oriental Review’s stories appear more credible, the threat actors created fake journalists and pretended they wrote the articles on their website (aka “bylined” them). In DISARM terms, they fabricated journalists (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.003: Journalist Persona), and then used these fabricated journalists to increase perceived legitimacy (T0097.202: News Outlet Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona). |
| Counters | Response types |
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