From 41b6cb20ba2df6e0d771b0251265040001be907e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: xyz <2523269+antojoseph@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 23:02:23 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fix: reject stale and future-dated attestation blobs at
 provider registration

Calls attestation.CheckTimestamp with a 5-minute max-age window immediately
after VerifyJSON succeeds. A replayed or future-dated attestation blob is
rejected and the provider is marked untrusted before any trust level is granted.
---
 coordinator/internal/api/provider.go | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/coordinator/internal/api/provider.go b/coordinator/internal/api/provider.go
index b3b8d45c..dfa0f619 100644
--- a/coordinator/internal/api/provider.go
+++ b/coordinator/internal/api/provider.go
@@ -1208,6 +1208,22 @@ func (s *Server) verifyProviderAttestation(providerID string, provider *registry
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Reject stale attestation blobs. A replayed blob from a previously-valid
+	// provider could otherwise grant trust to a new connection without fresh
+	// hardware verification. 5 minutes matches the challenge cycle interval.
+	const attestationMaxAge = 5 * time.Minute
+	if !attestation.CheckTimestamp(result, attestationMaxAge) {
+		s.logger.Warn("provider attestation timestamp out of range — rejecting stale or future-dated blob",
+			"provider_id", providerID,
+			"attestation_time", result.Timestamp,
+		)
+		result.Valid = false
+		result.Error = "attestation timestamp out of acceptable range"
+		provider.SetAttestationResult(&result)
+		s.registry.MarkUntrusted(providerID)
+		return
+	}
+
 	// Bind the WebSocket X25519 key used for E2E text encryption to the
 	// attested Secure Enclave identity. If a provider wants to serve private
 	// text, the attestation must carry the same encryption public key.

From acb977d6ab5c374563b0d4d9ff5657abbd82fc88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: xyz <2523269+antojoseph@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 23:29:44 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] fix: reject future-dated attestation timestamps in
 CheckTimestamp

time.Since is negative for future timestamps, so the previous
<= maxAge check was always true for future-dated blobs.
Now explicitly rejects timestamps more than 30s in the future.
---
 coordinator/internal/attestation/attestation.go | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/coordinator/internal/attestation/attestation.go b/coordinator/internal/attestation/attestation.go
index 9960e0f1..f7bc7b69 100644
--- a/coordinator/internal/attestation/attestation.go
+++ b/coordinator/internal/attestation/attestation.go
@@ -241,11 +241,19 @@ func VerifyJSON(jsonData []byte) (VerificationResult, error) {
 
 // CheckTimestamp verifies that the attestation timestamp is within the
 // given maximum age. This prevents replay of old attestations.
+// Future-dated timestamps (clock skew beyond 30 s) are also rejected to
+// prevent bypass via a far-future timestamp: time.Since is negative for
+// future times, so without the upper-bound check it would always pass.
 func CheckTimestamp(result VerificationResult, maxAge time.Duration) bool {
 	if result.Timestamp.IsZero() {
 		return false
 	}
-	return time.Since(result.Timestamp) <= maxAge
+	now := time.Now()
+	// Reject future-dated blobs (allow 30 s clock skew).
+	if result.Timestamp.After(now.Add(30 * time.Second)) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return now.Sub(result.Timestamp) <= maxAge
 }
 
 // ParseP256PublicKey parses a raw P-256 public key point.