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Adds a qualification suite that drives Guardian from the outside through both consumer SDKs and reports what a run is entitled to claim. Two profiles. The deterministic profile needs no chain and runs against a Compose stack (server, Postgres, RPC stub). The live profile drives real Miden transactions funded from a treasury and is dispatch-only. Both SDKs run the same scenario manifest, so a divergence between the Rust and TypeScript clients shows up as one passing and one failing rather than as an untested gap. Coverage spans account creation, funding, note consumption, signer add and remove, threshold override, asset send, guardian migration, and the negative controls for each. Structure: - qualification/manifest: the scenario contract both drivers read - crates/qualification-driver: Rust driver, manifest validator, treasury accounting, run-result derivation and cross-SDK merge - packages/miden-multisig-client/tests/qualification: TypeScript driver - qualification/stack: Compose stack, shell harness, redaction, teardown A run refuses to overclaim. Filtered runs, single-SDK runs and environment-blocked runs each weaken the claim rather than reporting success, and an action with no driver implementation fails closed on a required scenario so a gap can never read as a pass. CI gains a qualification-harness job that validates the manifest and runs the shell library tests. Both qualification workflows are dispatch-only: the deterministic one until F12 is understood on a Linux runner, the live one until the treasury handoff exists. Also fixes the endpoint-commitment scheme binding in the Rust multisig client, which the suite found. See docs/QUALIFICATION_FINDINGS.md for that and twelve other findings. Refs #432
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WalkthroughThis change adds a cross-SDK Guardian qualification suite with Rust and TypeScript drivers, deterministic and live workflows, Docker orchestration, treasury management, report merging, and CI integration. It also adds multisig threshold and state-reconciliation behavior, allowlist retries, tests, fixtures, schemas, and documentation. ChangesQualification contracts and execution
Qualification infrastructure
Multisig and server behavior
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 5 (Critical) | ~120 minutes Severity of issue fixed: Medium Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant CI
participant QualificationStack
participant RustDriver
participant TypeScriptDriver
participant ReportMerger
CI->>QualificationStack: build or pull image and start services
QualificationStack-->>CI: readiness and endpoints
CI->>RustDriver: run selected qualification scenarios
CI->>TypeScriptDriver: run selected qualification scenarios
RustDriver-->>ReportMerger: Rust result report
TypeScriptDriver-->>ReportMerger: TypeScript result report
ReportMerger-->>CI: merged conclusion and qualification claim
Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Before merging, bound and redact cosign diagnostics, prevent operator-cookie forwarding to redirect targets, and correct the qualification profile table so contributors can rely on the documented workflow behavior. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation Issue Resolution Add a CI-triggered deterministic job for relevant pull requests and pushes to Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 59.25% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 373 functions across 52 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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…rences There was no prerequisites section anywhere: not in docs/QUALIFICATION.md, not in qualification/README.md, not in the skill. "Needs a container runtime and nothing else" was also wrong, since a run needs cargo, node and python3 as well. Adds a setup section listing what each tool is for, derived from the scripts and the dependency tree rather than guessed. Notably libpq is not needed: the driver's tree has no pq-sys, and CI installs libpq-dev for the server jobs. Every command in the section was run as written. Also points the treasury instructions at qualification/.treasury-secrets.env so a local run loads the per-network key instead of pasting a secret into a shell, and adds the balance preflight. F12 is fixed, so the workflow comment and the setup note no longer cite it as what keeps the pull-request trigger off. What is left there is that the profile has not run on a Linux runner.
… path Three gaps the setup section left open. Acknowledgement keys and the operator allowlist read like setup steps and are not: run.sh provisions both per run into gitignored directories. Says so, with the one case that is manual (a hand-started server needs the fixture's own Falcon key, because the deterministic profile registers a committed fixture account bound to one guardian commitment) and why the development default of regenerating per boot breaks it. Funding had a command table but no sequence, so a new network or a post-reset rebuild had to be reconstructed from it: treasury-new, save the secret before anything else since it prints once, fund from the network faucet, bootstrap as the deploying transaction, check. Individual test accounts need nothing, which was also unstated. Every command verified against the live testnet treasury. Also drops a leftover sentence claiming a run does not carry its funding summary, which contradicted the paragraph directly below it. It does.
…abulary What existed named the files to touch but not the procedure, and the one detailed claim in it was wrong: a new action needs six edits across five files, not four, and the body goes in the file for the action's family rather than always in `live`. Adds "Adding a scenario" to docs/QUALIFICATION.md. It splits the two jobs, since a scenario composing existing actions needs no driver code at all, and covers the field meanings, the edit sites for a new action, how required-ness interacts with per-network exclusion, running one scenario without the stack, and the obligation to break a new scenario on purpose before trusting it. Also fixes a pointer that would have misled anyone following it. scenarios.toml referenced the spec contract for the action vocabulary, whose list stopped at 19 of the 40 actions now implemented. The vocabulary is the `From<String>` arms in the driver, which reject an unknown name at load time rather than skipping it; verified by feeding the validator a made-up action. Both files now say so.
…vironment` A live run drives a public Miden network and a remote prover, neither of them under this repository's control. Both fail in ways that read exactly like a scenario failing: a connection dropped mid-execution, a prover deadline, a node that stops answering. Three consecutive runs reported those as `product`, and with the treasury armed and the nightly scheduled a bad testnet night would have paged claiming a product defect. On the live profile only, a failure whose evidence points at the link is now classified `environment`. The rule is the SDK clients' own transient classifier unchanged (`guardian_shared::retry` and its TypeScript mirror): permanent status evidence anywhere vetoes transient evidence anywhere, and the wording fallback applies only when nothing carried a status. So a quorum refusing an under-signed proposal still fails as `product` while `transport error: Timeout expired` does not. `Classification::Environment` already existed in the enum, the schema and the docs, and `blocks_conclusion` was already written to exempt it. Nothing ever produced it. Using it avoids a second spelling for the same idea, and keeps the distinction between a scenario that never got a verdict (`environment_blocked`) and one the network broke under. The deterministic profile is deliberately exempt: it gates pull requests against a stack the suite brings up itself, so a failure there is the product's whatever its wording. The scenario's own profile decides, not the runner's configuration, so no combination of options can lend a deterministic scenario the exemption. Also: - `exit_code` read every failure when deciding setup versus product. One setup failure alongside an environment failure reported exit 1, a product defect. It now reads only the failures that caused the conclusion. - Exit 3 (nothing ran) now covers both shapes the environment takes. - Funding errors dropped their cause: `ClientError`'s `Display` prints a summary and keeps the rest on the source chain, so `the funding transfer failed: transaction proving failed` carried no evidence of the prover timeout underneath it. Funding now renders the whole chain. - Every run prints what it lost to the network and why, locally and in the CI job summary. A green run that quietly drops scenarios is as unread as a red one. Both drivers are pinned to `fixtures/qualification/environment-classification.json`, which holds the verbatim reasons from real runs on both sides of the line. A new wording is a one-line data change both pick up; a signal added on one side only fails a test.
The header still said the per-network environments did not exist and that every scheduled run would stop at the missing-secret check. Both environments now exist, hold QUAL_TREASURY_KEY, and are branch-locked to the default branch, and a live failure the network caused no longer pages as a product defect.
The scenario asked whether an account created by an earlier build still works under this one, which a Miden contract pin bump breaks and nothing else in the suite would notice. It could never have passed twice. Guardian holds the only full copy of a private account, and the stack tears its database down with the run (`teardown.sh`, `down --volumes`, over a per-run Compose project). `open_heritage` loaded the account with `pull_account`, which reads Guardian's `get_state` rather than the chain, so a fresh Guardian has nothing to serve. Worse, the scenario transacts: consuming the funding note advances the account's nonce, and the resulting state exists only in the database that is about to be wiped. The first run to use the account would have made it permanently undrivable. Making it work needs a store outside the run. A committed snapshot goes stale the moment the account transacts; a cached snapshot bricks the account whenever a run dies between transacting and exporting; persisting the whole database reintroduces the cross-run contamination that fresh stacks exist to prevent. None of those is worth carrying for a property that is better checked at the moment of a pin bump than on a nightly. Recorded in `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` under "Current limits", including why it was removed, so this is not rediscovered as an oversight. The removal also takes the `heritage-new` command and the persisted-signer constructors, which existed only for this scenario, and leaves the suite at 37 scenarios over 40 actions. This also clears the one permanently environment-blocked scenario on both legs, so a non-zero environment-blocked count in a run is now informative.
Removes `docs/QUALIFICATION_FINDINGS.md` and the speckit feature directory, and every reference to both. Two of the findings were load-bearing and are relocated rather than dropped: - the proposer's signature is attached on create by the Rust SDK and not by the TypeScript one, so the same 2-of-3 flow needs one more signature on one path than the other. That is a fact an SDK consumer needs, not a qualification note, so it moves to `docs/MULTISIG_SDK.md` beside the signing API it affects. - absence from GUARDIAN's pending set is not completion: canonicalization removes a proposal both when it applies the delta and when it gives up on it, so a discarded delta reads exactly like a successful execution. That is why both drivers assert chain confirmation plus a canonical delta instead of the simpler check, and the rationale now sits in `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` where someone changing that assertion will find it. The rest was already duplicated in `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` (the Node consumption workarounds under "Current limits", and the fixed defects in the prose about what the suite found), or described a defect that is now fixed in code. Also drops two transient claims from the skill: a network's gRPC-web response code on a given day goes stale faster than anyone edits a skill, and the suite already treats it as an outage that recovers without a manifest edit. Finding numbers are replaced by what they said, since the numbering no longer resolves anywhere. `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` is now the single entry point, covering local setup, what the stack provisions (including acknowledgement keys), running either profile, reading a result, adding a scenario, and creating and funding a treasury from zero.
…m this branch All five reproduced before being fixed. **The operator client was never built, so no TypeScript scenario could start.** Both qualification workflows built only `guardian-client`, but `tests/qualification/actions/operator.ts` imports `@openzeppelin/guardian-operator-client` at module scope and `runner.ts` imports that unconditionally, so the missing gitignored `dist/` is a package-resolution failure on *both* profiles rather than only the operator scenarios. Reproduced by moving the directory aside: the failure is at `actions/operator.ts:1`. Both workflows now build it. **Loading into an empty store never compared commitments.** The branch checked only that *some* on-chain commitment existed, so a fresh cosigner could adopt state that disagrees with chain, which is the thing the check was added for. The comparison already existed in the shared `isSafeToAdoptGuardianState`; the empty-store path had reimplemented half of it, which is exactly the drift `adopt.ts` was extracted to prevent. It now goes through the shared rule, handed the commitment already read so two reads cannot disagree. The node is still only consulted for an account that has transacted: one that has not is not deployed, and reading for it would make loading a fresh account depend on the node as well as on GUARDIAN. **An `environment` failure still failed the TypeScript leg.** Fallout from classifying those as `failed` + `environment` rather than `environment_blocked`: the exit gate read the outcome alone, so a prover timeout exited non-zero and would have failed the nightly, the opposite of `blocks_conclusion` and of what `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` promises. The rule is now `blocksConclusion`, named after its Rust counterpart, so the two legs cannot drift on what counts as a failure again. **Merging a restart pass erased earlier failures.** The latest-wins fold that made a full claim reachable also let a passing post-restart pass unfail a product failure from the first pass, while the shell kept the failing exit code, so the report and the job disagreed about the same run. The fold now keeps the worse verdict, with `Skipped` treated as the absence of a verdict so the durability skip still upgrades. **The durability scenario could not detect proposal loss.** It asked only whether listing proposals errored, and an empty list is a successful response, so it passed whether or not anything survived. It now looks for the fixture proposal by nonce. Fixing that surfaced a second problem: seeding through the manifest would have made the assertion depend on `det-proposal-lifecycle` running first, so `--scenario det-restart-durability` would fail for a reason unrelated to durability. The pre-restart phase now seeds its own proposal, idempotently, and `proposal-create` no-ops post-restart for the same reason `register` already does: a pass that rewrites the data it checks proves nothing. Verified against a real stack, not only unit tests. With seeding disabled and the scenario run alone the post-restart pass fails with `the account survived the restart but its proposal at nonce 1 did not: GUARDIAN lists 0 proposal(s) []`; with seeding restored it passes. The old check passed both. Also fixed while here: the `readOnChainCommitment` test mock used `mockResolvedValueOnce` queues that `beforeEach` never reset, so a test whose code path stopped reading the node left its value for the next test, which then asserted against another test's setup. That coupling made an unrelated change fail a test three cases away.
…d stale limits Review findings from the architectural pass. The concrete defects first. **The run summary printed nothing, ever.** `qual_print_summary` reads a top-level `scenario_results`, but both callers pass `merged/report.json`, which nests `networks -> runs -> scenario_results`. It exited quietly on every merged run. That silently removed the one thing making an environment-classified failure safe: a green run that loses scenarios to the network is only acceptable while the losses are visible. It reads both shapes now, prints per network, and was verified against the real merged report rather than against a fixture written to match the code, which is how it shipped broken. **A duplicate-signature attempt treated an unreadable listing as evidence.** `signature_count(...).unwrap_or(before)` made a failed follow-up read mean "the count did not change", which is the one thing the scenario exists to establish. Not being able to look is not an answer, so it is now an explicit failure. Same bug class as the durability check that read `Ok(vec![])` as a surviving proposal. **The TypeScript recovery scenario proved something weaker than the Rust one.** Rust calls `recover_by_key`, discovering the account from the key alone; TypeScript called `load(accountId, signer)` with the id already known, which only shows GUARDIAN serves state for an account you can already name. `recoverByKey` exists in the TypeScript SDK, so this was the two drivers proving different things under one scenario name, which is precisely the drift this suite exists to catch. TypeScript now discovers first, then loads and compares. **The cross-SDK handoff titles overclaimed.** They said the receiving SDK "signs and executes"; the action lists hand off signing and execute in the originating SDK. Titles now say what the actions do. Cross-SDK execution is a real gap, recorded as such rather than implied by a name. **`consumer_findings` was emitted empty** while the harness carried the two workarounds it was designed to record: the WASM alias for the Node entry's missing exports, and the HTTP/2 shim. They are properties of the published artifact, so any run whose results include a TypeScript leg now records them, applied on the merge because the Rust leg writes the base file. **The qualification driver was never typechecked in CI.** `tsconfig.json` covers only `src/`, so the driver typechecks under its own config and no job ran it, which is how a missing import reaches a run instead of a build. The Qualification Harness job now runs `typecheck:tests`. **`docs/QUALIFICATION.md` disagreed with the code**, which matters more than the remaining code gaps because it is where an operator looks to decide what a night proved. Corrected: both workflows are no longer dispatch-only (live runs nightly); account pausing is no longer unproven (`det-account-paused` is required and drives a paused account through an SDK, though a live paused account on chain is still untested); Rust offline signing no longer skips. Added, because no run proves them: that neither profile gates a pull request, that no scenario runs in a browser or installs from the registry, and that the completion rule's negative control (`det-discarded-delta-hidden`) is still unimplemented, so the rule is correct by construction and unfalsified.
…oss two directories Found by running a new live scenario, which failed its own spend cap with nothing wrong. `fund_once` takes the directory holding the treasury lock and the spend ledger. The live Rust scenarios passed `context.account_dir`, which is per run, while the TypeScript leg's `fund` subprocess and every `treasury-*` command used `/tmp/qualification-treasury`. So the two legs took different locks and kept separate tallies, and three things built earlier on this branch were quietly not working: - the spend cap saw one leg of a run, never the whole run - the lock meant to serialize treasury access between the legs was locking two different files - the per-run reset cleared a file the Rust leg never wrote That last one is why this surfaced. The Rust leg's ledger had been growing since the cap was added and stood at 6,800,000 against a 1,600,000 cap, so the next live run was going to fail on the cap regardless of its contents. The nightly is armed, so it would have failed there, blaming the treasury. `LiveContext` now carries an explicit `treasury_dir`, six duplicated path literals collapse into one `DEFAULT_TREASURY_DIR`, and two tests pin the invariant that the lock and the ledger share a directory. Also fixed, from the same run: the run summary printed another run's result. A single-SDK run writes no merged report, so the printer read the previous run's leftover file and announced `conclusion success claim full` directly underneath this run's failure, which is worse than the silence it replaced. It now takes the run id and says it has no report for this run rather than showing someone else's. And the pin-bump checklist promised when the heritage scenario was removed, which was never written: `MIDEN_COMPATIBILITY.md` now carries "Before bumping the Miden pin", including the step that is easiest to skip because every other signal stays green, namely qualifying a pre-bump account against a post-bump server. `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` records why the discarded-delta control is still unimplemented, with the three dead ends found while attempting it, so the next attempt starts from what is already known rather than repeating it.
The dead ends were recorded in prose but the code behind them was not, so the next attempt would have rebuilt it to reach the same wall.
Rotation had one path qualified and it was the air-gapped one. The offline scenario creates a switch proposal without contacting GUARDIAN at all, which is the right test for an unreachable GUARDIAN and the wrong one for every other day. A deployment whose GUARDIAN is reachable rotates through the pending set: GUARDIAN coordinates the proposal, cosigners sign it there, and only then does it execute. That path had no scenario, and rotation is a first-class custody operation. `live-guardian-switch-online-2of3-falcon` covers it, and is required. Two new actions: - `guardian-switch-online` proposes through `propose_transaction` and then asserts the proposal is in GUARDIAN's pending set. That assertion is the point: a proposal that never reached GUARDIAN was created offline whatever the call was named, so without it this scenario could pass while re-testing the path that already had coverage. - `guardian-switch-assert` reads the account's own `guardian_commitment()` after execution and compares it to the target's. The existing `guardian-migrate` action only checks that the exported document is a SwitchGuardian proposal, which says nothing about the account. A rotation that executes without moving the binding is the failure worth catching, because every other signal looks like success. 2-of-3 rather than 1-of-1: coordinating cosigner signatures through the pending set is what distinguishes this from the offline path, and `sign_proposal` is a no-op at threshold 1. Falcon rather than ECDSA: the offline rotation is ECDSA, so the pair now covers both schemes for a flow whose scheme is encoded in the advice payload, which closes one row of the scheme table in "Known coverage gaps". Verified on testnet, and verified to be able to fail. The scenario passes in 30s. Swapping `propose_transaction` for `create_proposal_offline` and changing nothing else turns it into a product failure naming the reason: "the rotation proposal ... is not in GUARDIAN's pending set, so it was not coordinated online". The online assertion is load-bearing rather than decorative.
`det-account-paused` proves GUARDIAN's own gate refuses a proposal, which is real but runs without a chain, so it cannot show the part that matters to custody: that the pause stops a transaction which would otherwise land. Execution needs GUARDIAN's acknowledgement, so a paused account cannot execute and nothing reaches the chain. `live-account-paused-1of1-ecdsa` covers that, and is required. The proposal is created before the pause deliberately: refusing to create one shows the gate on the way in, which the deterministic scenario already covers, while refusing to execute one that is already signed and ready shows the gate standing between a client and the chain. The scenario then unpauses and executes the same proposal, and asserts the balance moved, because a refusal on its own proves nothing: any outage refuses a call. The operator login and pause calls are reused from the deterministic scenario rather than reimplemented, so the two cannot drift on how an operator pauses an account. Verified on testnet. Tightening the refusal check is what made this worth the runs: the first version accepted `GUARDIAN_ACCOUNT_PAUSED` or the bare word "paused", and demanding the code alone failed, because the code does not survive into the error the multisig client raises. GUARDIAN answers `GUARDIAN_ACCOUNT_PAUSED` and `guardian_client::ClientError` exposes it through `guardian_code()`, but `MultisigError` carries only the gRPC status and the human message. So a scenario driving the multisig SDK cannot assert which refusal it received without matching user-facing copy, and neither can a consumer branching on one. That is recorded as a finding in `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` with the remedy (a `guardian_code()` on `MultisigError`). Rather than pretend the wording is the evidence, this scenario proves causation structurally: the same proposal, with the same client, refused while paused and executed once unpaused. The wording check only rules out a refusal that obviously has nothing to do with pausing, and says so.
Three gaps, two scenarios, and one of them closes the test both reviews called the highest-value thing missing. **Producer proposals (issue #266).** Every other scenario proposes through the typed API, so between them they cover the seven built-in proposal types and none covered the producer path: serialized Miden transaction bytes plus a label the SDK has never heard of. That is the unbounded surface, and an integration built on it would break without this suite noticing. The payment is an ordinary P2ID send whose correctness is covered elsewhere; what is under test is the label surviving the round trip, read back from GUARDIAN rather than from the client that made it, because the client's own copy would agree with itself. It stops at `custom-proposal-prepare` because that is where the SDK's responsibility ends: a custom proposal is deliberately not executed by `execute_proposal` (the SDK cannot rebuild an arbitrary producer transaction), so it returns the cosigner signatures and GUARDIAN's acknowledgement and the integration submits with its own Miden client. Preparing re-executes the producer's own bytes at the proposal's anchored block and refuses unless they reproduce the signed commitment, so reaching it proves the label survived, the threshold was met, and the bytes still match what was signed. **The completion rule's negative control.** Completion is asserted as chain confirmation plus a canonical delta, and not "the proposal left the pending set", because canonicalization removes a discarded delta exactly as it removes a successful one. Nothing falsified that rule, so a regression reading a discard as success would have passed the whole suite. The producer API turns out to be the one path that separates acknowledgement from submission: preparing pushes the delta to obtain the acknowledgement, and submitting is a separate call. Stopping in between leaves a candidate that can never land, which is exactly the state the abandon API exists for, reached through supported public calls rather than by forcing GUARDIAN into it. So the control rides on the scenario above, which already performs every step up to that point, and `det-discarded-delta-hidden` is gone: it was specified, optional and unimplemented, and the deterministic profile cannot reach a discard at all. The assertion establishes the proposal is pending *before* abandoning. Without that, a proposal already gone from the pending set would satisfy the check afterwards without the discard having hidden anything. **P2IDE.** P2ID was covered; P2IDE is the same flow with a block height attached and nothing exercised it. The note is self-addressed because a timelock is only observable from the recipient's side. The assertion is a pair, committed but not consumable, because either half alone is satisfied by the wrong thing: committed alone passes for a plain P2ID, and not-consumable alone passes for a note that never arrived. All verified on testnet, and both verified to be able to fail. Custom plus discard passes in 42s. P2IDE passes in 28s, and dropping its timelock to `None` turns it into a product failure naming the reason ("a note timelocked to block 4000000000 is already consumable"), so the timelock is what holds the note rather than sync lag. `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` is corrected: the completion-rule entry no longer claims the only supported way to obtain an acknowledged delta is to execute, which was wrong. The two dead ends that remain true are kept (the deterministic profile cannot reach a discard; competing executions cannot diverge because `push_delta` refuses a stale base and allows one candidate per account).
…ade pass into CI **Scheme mirrors.** Threshold change ran on ECDSA only and the procedure override on Falcon only, while both encode the scheme into the advice payload. That is exactly where the two scheme-binding defects this suite has already found were hiding, so running each on one scheme left the other half of that surface untested. Add-signer and remove-signer were doubled for the same reason, and GUARDIAN rotation is covered by the offline (ECDSA) and online (Falcon) pair, so this closes the table. No new code: the actions read the scheme from the session, so the gap was two manifest entries. `live-change-threshold-2of3-falcon` and `live-procedure-threshold-2of3-ecdsa`, both required, both verified on testnet. **Upgrade pass.** `--upgrade-from` existed but nothing in CI passed it, so qualifying an upgrade needed a local checkout. The deterministic workflow now takes it as an input. Deterministic is the right home: the question is whether the image under test boots on a database an older release wrote and whether the rows survive its migrations, which is entirely about GUARDIAN's Postgres. A live network adds nothing to that and the upgrade pass re-runs the whole selection, so putting it on the live nightly would roughly double the treasury spend to learn nothing more. The docs previously described this as post-release verification, which is the weaker of the two things it does. `--upgrade-from` sets only the image the stack boots on; the image under test stays the local build unless `--image-tag` pulls a published one. So seeding from the last release and upgrading to a branch build runs *that branch's* migrations against real rows, which is the question worth asking before merging a migration rather than after shipping it. Both forms are now documented, that one first. Also withdrawn: the claim that automating it needs a release decision. For a branch the rule is plain (seed from the latest published release, upgrade to the default target), and `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` now says the real reason it is not automatic, which is that the deterministic workflow gates nothing today. `MIDEN_COMPATIBILITY.md` records two irreversible data resets that shipped as embedded migrations; a third would delete rows on first boot and this pass is the only thing in the suite that would notice.
…tions The upgrade pass costs a full second run of the selection, so running it on every change would tax every pull request for a question most of them do not raise. Running it never is how a migration that cannot boot on the current release's data reaches a release. The deterministic workflow now decides: if the change touches `crates/server/migrations/`, it seeds from the latest published release and upgrades to the branch build, which runs that branch's migrations against rows an older release wrote. Otherwise it skips. An explicit `upgrade-from` input still overrides the decision. Inert for now, and deliberately so: a dispatch has no base commit to diff against, so this starts deciding only when the `pull_request` trigger in the workflow header is restored. That is the same condition as making the profile a required check, and the docs now say so rather than implying the pass is already automatic. The detector was checked in both directions rather than assumed: it stays quiet on this branch, which touches no migrations, and fires on 7733209, which added the dashboard-stats migration. A detector that never fires would have turned the pass off forever while looking configured. `fetch-depth: 0` on the checkout, because diffing against a pull request's base needs the history a shallow clone does not have.
Offline export and import ran on Falcon only, and it is the last flow where doubling the scheme buys a code path rather than a combination. The exported document carries the collected signatures, and both parsing them back (`SignatureScheme::parse_signature_hex`) and building the advice entry from them (`build_signature_advice_entry`) dispatch on the scheme, so Falcon and ECDSA take different code through exactly the part this scenario exists to cover. That path also changed recently, when Rust stopped tying offline signing to offline execution, so it is newly exercised rather than settled. Verified on both SDKs rather than Rust alone, because the advice-building code exists separately in each and a Rust-only run would have shipped the TypeScript leg untested. Both pass. The remaining single-scheme flows are left single on purpose. Execute already runs on both schemes at 2-of-3, so taking 3-of-3 to ECDSA would add a combination and no new code: the shape only changes threshold arithmetic, which is scheme-independent. Recovery, below-threshold and duplicate signature are negative controls and discovery rather than payload encoding, which is the criterion that justified doubling the config-writing procedures after the two scheme-binding defects were found there. Running every combination would make the suite slower and no more truthful.
…covered Four attempts at a scenario for issue #415 all ended with `AlreadyPresent`, which cannot distinguish recovery from never having lost the note. Rather than accept that status and ship a scenario that proves nothing, the gap is recorded with what the attempts ruled out: private notes behave no differently from public ones, `reset_miden_client` reopens the same directory instead of emptying it, and a recovering client built at its own fresh directory still finds the record in place. That leaves `pull_account` as the step that puts it there, which was not chased further. Worth writing down because it is not only a testing problem: a consumer confirming their own recovery path hits the same wall.
Rotation through the pending set was qualified on Rust only, and the TypeScript SDK has its own implementation of every step, so a divergence there would have been invisible. Both legs now run it, and both pass. Writing the TypeScript half surfaced an API difference that matters to this scenario specifically. Rust's `list_proposals` fetches from GUARDIAN; TypeScript's `listProposals` returns the client's own local cache, and only `syncProposals` calls `getDeltaProposals`. The point of this scenario is to prove the proposal reached GUARDIAN's pending set rather than being created offline, so a naive port using `listProposals` would have passed against the cache, where an offline proposal sits just as happily, and tested nothing. The TypeScript action goes through `syncProposals`, and says why at the call site so it is not "simplified" back later. Same method name, different semantics across the two SDKs. That is the kind of drift this suite exists to catch, and it turned up from doubling a scenario rather than from reading either SDK.
…e stale claims
"Current limits" had become a changelog. Five entries described defects that
are fixed, three of them saying so in their own titles ("the Rust SDK could
not change a threshold, and now can"; "offline signing was an SDK
divergence, and is fixed"; a TypeScript `load()` entry whose title claims a
live limit and whose body says it was repaired). Two more narrated the
allowlist-reload investigation twice over, and one relitigated the cargo
multiplexing decision. None of that is a limit, all of it is in git history
and the pull request, and every line of it ages.
It also overlapped "Known coverage gaps", so the page answered "what does a
run not prove" twice, in two places, with two different answers. Those are
now one section, grouped by what a reader is actually asking: what gates
`main`, which consumer surfaces are untested, which flows and combinations
are missing, and what to know when operating the suite.
Five claims were stale rather than merely old:
- `det-discarded-delta-hidden` was listed as an unimplemented optional
scenario; it no longer exists, and only `operator-audit` does
- live outcomes pointed at the feature's `tasks.md`, which went with the
speckit directory
- "the schedule is deliberately absent until the per-network environments
exist" contradicted the same page 550 lines earlier: the schedule and the
environments both exist
- "before arming the treasury secret, lock the deployment branches" was
written as a future instruction for something already done
- the migration target was documented as `QUAL_GUARDIAN_MIGRATION_ENDPOINT`
only, which the Rust driver does not read; it takes
`QUAL_GUARDIAN_MIGRATION_GRPC`, and a reader following the old text would
set a variable nothing consumes
Two more were overtaken by this branch: a paused account on a live chain is
now covered by `live-account-paused-1of1-ecdsa`, and threshold change and
the procedure override no longer run on one scheme each.
745 lines to 633, and the intro now maps the page and points at the section
that exists rather than one renamed out from under it. Every in-page anchor
and cross-document link checked.
The qualification typecheck step added earlier builds the two GUARDIAN clients but not the package under test, and `tests/browser/harness.ts` imports the package's own `dist/`. That directory is gitignored, so the job failed on a clean runner with `Cannot find module '../../dist/index.js'` plus a cascading `unknown` where the unresolved import defeated inference. It passed locally only because a previous build had left `dist/` in place, which is the same trap as the operator client: a test tree that typechecks against build output needs that output to exist, and every `dist/` here is gitignored. Reproduced by moving `dist/` aside, which gave the three CI errors exactly, and confirmed the build clears them. Only this job needs it. The qualification workflows run the driver, which imports the package through `src/`, and `harness.ts` is not collected by vitest because it is not a `.test.ts`.
…asked about The discard control was added to falsify the completion rule. The first thing it falsified was the driver's own implementation of that rule: it reported `Confirmed` for a delta that had definitely been discarded. `wait_for_execution` asked two questions, neither of them about the proposal under test: does local state agree with chain, and does any canonical delta in the last twenty carry that commitment. An account whose delta was discarded satisfies both, because it never moved, so it still agrees with chain and the *previous* delta still carries that commitment. In the ordinary flow the delta lands, the state moves, and the newly canonical delta happens to be the right one, so the check passed for the right reason by coincidence and the flaw stayed latent. It would have surfaced as the suite reading a discarded delta as a successful execution, which is the one thing the completion rule exists to prevent. The canonical delta must now be at the proposal's own nonce. The nonce is read before executing, because once the proposal leaves the pending set there is nothing left to read it from; that is a small helper rather than threading it through the twelve places a proposal id is recorded. It stays `Option`, and a lookup that fails falls back to the old comparison rather than failing the scenario for a transport reason, with the reason string naming which form it used. Verified in both directions rather than assumed. The discard control now passes, taking 3m38s instead of 43s because concluding "this will never land" means waiting out the canonicalization deadline. `live-execute-2of3-ecdsa` and `live-p2id-send-1of1-ecdsa`, which lean hardest on this check on the normal path, both still pass, so the binding matches what actually canonicalizes. Also ports the live pause scenario to TypeScript, so `live-account-paused-1of1-ecdsa` runs on both SDKs. The operator pause is reached through a `setAccountPaused` helper exported from the TypeScript operator actions rather than reimplemented, so the two drivers cannot drift on what pausing an account means, the same way the Rust action reuses the deterministic helpers. Its TypeScript leg has not run yet.
…closed on both Fixing the completion check on Rust alone created exactly the divergence this suite exists to catch. `waitForExecution` in the TypeScript driver confirmed on any canonical delta carrying the current commitment, which is the same unbound match Rust had: an account whose delta was discarded never moves, so the previous delta still carries that commitment. Every TypeScript live execute trusted it, and because custom/abandon is still Rust-only, the control that caught this on Rust could never have caught the TypeScript copy. It now requires the canonical delta to be at the proposal's own nonce, read before executing at both call sites, which already sync proposals there. Both drivers now fail closed when the nonce cannot be read. The previous Rust fallback to the commitment-only comparison restored the unbound match in precisely the case where it is most likely to confirm a delta that never landed, and trading a false pass for a false failure is the wrong way round for this check. Neither driver confirms without a nonce, and both say so. `docs/QUALIFICATION.md` states the bind in the completion rationale, including that the check matched on commitment alone until the discard control was written and that this was the first thing it caught, so the next reader has the concrete case rather than an abstract rule. Also fixes the pause scenario, whose TypeScript leg failed at 1-of-1 with "Still pending signatures". Rust attaches the proposer's signature when a proposal is created and TypeScript does not (a divergence already recorded in `docs/MULTISIG_SDK.md`), so the TypeScript leg reached the pause with an unsigned proposal and was refused for want of signatures rather than for the pause. `proposal-sign` now runs before the pause: not redundant at 1-of-1, because TypeScript's signature collection starts at cosigner zero precisely where Rust's starts at one, and the manifest says so since it looks redundant. The assertion caught that only because it demands the refusal name the pause. A looser check would have seen "refused", passed, and left the TypeScript pause leg permanently green while testing nothing. Verified on testnet: `live-account-paused-1of1-ecdsa` and `live-execute-2of3-ecdsa` both pass on both SDKs, the latter exercising the newly bound TypeScript check on the normal path.
… fix the upgrade pass Ports the last two Rust-only live scenarios to TypeScript, and addresses the four findings from the branch review. Custom proposals and P2IDE on both SDKs, which closes the remaining FR-023a gap. Both ported legs found divergences the Rust leg cannot see: - `syncProposals` rebuilds a proposal this client created from its own cached metadata, so a label GUARDIAN mangled reads back correctly on the client that proposed it and wrongly on every other one. The TypeScript leg reads the wire and decodes it through the SDK's own codec instead. - the TypeScript client never surfaces a note its own account sent itself, while the Rust client lists it as held and not yet consumable. Neither a status listing nor an availability listing returned it three minutes after the transaction canonicalized, against the same GUARDIAN and network the Rust leg passed on minutes earlier. The TypeScript leg reads the landing from the sending side, which keeps the assertion's pair intact. Review findings: - an upgrade run told its seeding pass the target image's revision while it was talking to the seed image, so the required identity scenario failed on every upgrade between two commits, and the TypeScript leg only ever saw the old server. Split into seed and target phases: each records the image it actually reached, the seed phase writes to `seed/` where the merge does not read it, and both SDKs now run against the upgraded target. - `commitment-verify` accepted any non-empty commitment on both drivers. It now compares against the fixture's own, with unit tests on both sides for the case that mattered, a different well-formed commitment. - the offline GUARDIAN migration had no migration-specific assertion, and its completion check falls back to chain agreement, which an execution that regressed to a no-op satisfies. It now ends on `guardian-switch-assert`. - concurrent runs shared `.env.generated`, both acknowledgement key directories and the operator allowlist. Everything a run writes moves under `qualification/stack/runs/<project>/`, removed with the stack, and Compose refuses to render without those paths. Running the upgrade pass end to end found two more defects in it: - the swap replaced one of the three GUARDIANs in the stack, leaving the migration target and the scheme-gated server on the seeded release, so the phase meant to judge the image under test was still asking an older one. - seeding ran every scenario against the old release, which registered the account `det-scheme-gate` expects to be refused. The target phase's registration then returned idempotent success and the scenario read a working gate as broken. The seed phase now runs only the scenarios that write rows an upgrade has to find again. Also: a locally built image is recorded by its content id rather than a tag, HTTP/2 stream errors from the network are classified `environment`, and the phase orchestration moved to `lib/phase.sh` where it is directly tested. Verified on testnet and against the stack: both ported scenarios pass on both SDKs; the offline migration passes on both SDKs against a real second GUARDIAN; a full deterministic run is green at claim `full`; an upgrade run from v0.17.0 is green end to end. 109 driver tests, 45 shell harness tests, 657 TypeScript tests, clippy clean, manifest valid. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… signers where they belong Four cuts, none of them touching anything that protects the treasury or decides a verdict. `report/artifacts.rs` carried `check_skew` and `check_digest_resolved`, which compare SDK versions, integrity hashes and Miden dependency versions across a registry install. Only tests ever called them: the `published` pairing they exist for is refused by `qual_check_pairing`, because nothing installs the SDKs from a registry, so there was nothing for them to compare. The fields stay, since the result schema carries them; the checks belong with the pairing, and are worth writing when something can actually install from a registry rather than now, against nothing. `funding/residual.rs` was a policy type for what happens to the residue in an ephemeral account, with one policy and no callers. `funding/network.rs` had two functions nobody called: `word_hex`, a one-line wrapper around `Word::to_hex`, and `ensure_reachable`, which asked whether a compiled-in endpoint had a host. What remains is I/O against a live node, which is why it stays untested. `funding/accounts.rs` was never about funding. It is the ephemeral signers a run's accounts are built from, used only by `scenario/live.rs`, so it moves to `scenario/signers.rs` unchanged. Net 218 lines removed. fmt clean, clippy 0, 100 driver tests, manifest valid. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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September 21, 2026 07:23
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Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/qualification-live.yml:
- Line 83: Move the issues: write permission out of the guard and
treasury-backed live jobs, keeping those jobs restricted to contents: read. Add
a separate scheduled failure-reporting job with issues: write and place the
existing issue-reporting behavior there, ensuring third-party or
dependency-executing jobs retain only the minimum permissions.
In `@crates/miden-multisig-client/src/client/offline.rs`:
- Around line 194-197: The offline execution flow must reject
TransactionType::Custom before requires_guardian_ack() contacts GUARDIAN and
before generic transaction construction. Update the surrounding documentation to
state that all modeled executable types except Custom are supported, or route
Custom through prepare_custom_execution instead; preserve the existing handling
for other transaction types.
In `@crates/qualification-driver/src/duration.rs`:
- Around line 76-78: Update the accumulation logic in the duration parsing
function to use checked_mul on value and multiplier before applying checked_add
to total, returning BudgetParseError::Overflow with the existing raw input when
either operation overflows.
In `@crates/qualification-driver/src/handoff.rs`:
- Around line 139-145: Update the failure handling around the TypeScript
cosigner’s output status check to include both captured streams in the anyhow
error message. Preserve the existing status and stdout details, and add
output.stderr with clear stdout/stderr labels so Vitest diagnostics are
retained.
In `@docs/MULTISIG_SDK.md`:
- Line 494: Update the documentation statement about switch_guardian signing and
execution to clarify that the flow avoids the current GUARDIAN, not network
access entirely. Preserve the distinction that execution submits a transaction
and offline creation may verify the new GUARDIAN and synchronize node state.
- Around line 971-977: Update the SDK signature comparison paragraph to state
that TypeScript includes the proposer signature for standard proposal creation
via createSwitchGuardianProposalOffline, or explicitly limit the no-signature
statement to normal online creation. Preserve the guidance to offer the proposal
to every cosigner and rely on signaturesCollected for threshold decisions.
In `@docs/QUALIFICATION.md`:
- Line 16: Update the deterministic entry in the qualification profile table to
state that it is dispatch-only and not a required pull-request check, keeping it
consistent with the documented behavior in the surrounding qualification
guidance.
In `@packages/miden-multisig-client/tests/qualification/cookieJar.ts`:
- Line 20: Update the cookie extraction in the qualification wrapper to
explicitly validate that response.headers.getSetCookie is available before
calling it; if unavailable, throw a clear error stating the session cookie
cannot be preserved, otherwise use the returned cookie list.
In `@qualification/stack/lib/diagnostics.sh`:
- Around line 11-13: Update the docker compose logs invocation in the
diagnostics helper to capture server, server-migration-target, and
server-scheme-gated while preserving the existing tail limit, output file, and
failure-tolerant behavior.
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…before it costs a candidate Review findings from the automated pass, verified against the code rather than taken on trust. `execute_imported_proposal` accepted `Custom`. `requires_guardian_ack()` is the inverse of `supports_offline_execution()`, which is true only for `SwitchGuardian`, so a custom proposal took the acknowledgement branch, and getting an acknowledgement pushes the delta. The account was therefore left holding a candidate at that nonce, and only then did the build fail with "cannot build a transaction for a custom proposal type". The caller was told the type was unsupported and not that a candidate now needed abandoning. It is refused up front, through a named predicate, `TransactionType::executable_from_exported_document`, so the rule sits beside the two it interacts with rather than being a bare match arm in the middle of an execution path. `issues: write` was granted at the workflow level of the live profile, which put it in scope for the job that runs the whole scenario harness with `QUAL_TREASURY_KEY`. The failing-night report moves to its own job that runs no scenario code and holds no treasury: the live job leaves a marker artifact carrying only the network and the harness exit code, and the reporting job turns markers into issues. `Budget::from_str` multiplied before it added, and only the addition was checked, so a value that parses as a `u64` and overflows when scaled to seconds panicked in debug and wrapped in release. `Budget` is deserialized from run result files as well as the committed manifest. Three smaller ones: the cross-SDK handoff dropped the TypeScript cosigner's stderr, which is where Vitest reports a failing assertion; the operator cookie jar treated a missing `getSetCookie` as "no cookies" and would have failed the operator scenarios as unauthorized; and diagnostics captured logs from one of the three GUARDIANs, so a rotation or scheme-gate failure lost exactly the log that would explain it. Two documentation corrections in MULTISIG_SDK.md: the side-channel callout claimed a `switch_guardian` needs no network at all, when what it avoids is the current GUARDIAN and its execution still submits a transaction; and the proposer-signature paragraph stated a blanket TypeScript rule that `createSwitchGuardianProposalOffline` breaks, since it signs as it exports. Not taken: the claim that QUALIFICATION.md's profile table advertises the deterministic profile as a required pull-request check. The table's columns are "Where it runs today" (manual dispatch) and "Intended", and the sentence under it says the profile is not yet required. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 2
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
🤖 Prompt to fix review comments
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only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
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Inline comments:
In `@crates/qualification-driver/src/handoff.rs`:
- Around line 144-147: Update the TypeScript cosigner failure handling before
the anyhow::bail! call to apply the shared redaction function and enforce the
established byte limit independently to output.stdout and output.stderr. Use the
sanitized, capped values in the error message while preserving the existing exit
status and failure context.
In `@packages/miden-multisig-client/tests/qualification/cookieJar.ts`:
- Line 18: Update the fetch call in the cookie-setting wrapper to reject
redirects before the request is sent, while preserving the existing headers and
init options; set the fetch redirect policy to error alongside the headers in
the options passed to fetch.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
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.github/workflows/qualification-live.ymlcrates/miden-multisig-client/src/client/offline.rscrates/miden-multisig-client/src/proposal.rscrates/qualification-driver/src/duration.rscrates/qualification-driver/src/handoff.rsdocs/MULTISIG_SDK.mdpackages/miden-multisig-client/tests/qualification/cookieJar.tsqualification/stack/lib/diagnostics.sh
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The section carried when each control was last run and two long accounts of what they found. Both are development notes: the dates are stale as soon as anything changes, and the findings are already explained beside the code they changed, in `scenario/account.rs` for the post-restart register and at the nonce comparison in both drivers. What a reader needs is what remains: what a negative control is, why it is run by hand rather than shipped as a switch, how to inject each defect, the verdict to demand, and the rule that a control must also pass after reverting. Two sentences record that the controls have caught real defects and point at where those fixes are reasoned about. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings back "On the path to `main`", "Consumer surfaces" and "Flows and combinations", removed in 1b7495e. These are not development notes, which is what that commit was clearing out. They are the list of what a green run does not prove: the profiles that gate nothing yet, the consumer surfaces no run touches, the SDK divergences the suite found but cannot assert around, and the flows nobody has covered. The section preamble promises exactly that list, line 21 sends a reader to it for why neither profile gates a pull request, and the pull request calls it authoritative. Without it those gaps would live only in a pull request body, which stops being anywhere anyone looks once this merges. Restored verbatim, so the file is byte-identical to its state before the cut. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ailure reports Follow-up to the review's second pass, on the two places the previous commit touched. Adding the TypeScript cosigner's stderr to the failure message meant the driver now puts another process's output into an error for the first time: everything else it reports is text it composed itself, which is why neither a size bound nor a redaction pass existed for it. A vitest run can print megabytes, and the string becomes a scenario `reason` in a retained artifact and a line in a CI log, and the shell-side redaction only covers the artifact. Both streams are capped at 4096 characters and swept for `QUAL_TREASURY_KEY` before they reach the message. The child inherits this process's environment, so that key is in scope for it, and a crash that echoed the environment would otherwise reach a CI log unredacted. The review asked for "the shared redaction function and the established byte limit"; neither exists in the driver, the redaction being shell-side over the results directory, so this is a local cap and a sweep of the one secret the driver knows it handed down rather than a framework. The operator cookie jar now sends `redirect: 'error'`. A redirect would carry the `cookie` header to wherever it points, and every endpoint this jar talks to is a local GUARDIAN with no reason to issue one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ve grpc framing
A nightly leg failed `live-change-threshold-2of3-ecdsa` as a product defect on
this, from the Miden node rather than from GUARDIAN:
failed to submit proven transaction: submission ... came back without a
definite outcome ... grpc request failed for submit_proven_transaction:
invalid content type: application/grpc
The request went out as `application/grpc-web` through the HTTP/2 shim and the
response came back framed as native gRPC, which is a proxy in front of the node
forwarding a backend response without translating it. It is the sibling of the
failure `h2Fetch.ts` already exists to work around, and it is intermittent: the
rest of that run submitted normally.
No signal matched, so it fell through to `product` and took the run's
conclusion with it. Nothing vetoed it either: the message carries "unknown
error", but the gRPC evidence table matches `grpccodeunknown` as one token and
the normalized text does not contain it.
The signal is the full `invalid content type: application/grpc` rather than
`invalid content type`. That pairing means a gRPC-web client received native
gRPC, which only a translating proxy produces, while the shorter form could
swallow a real defect if GUARDIAN ever served a wrong content type on its own
API.
Second miss of the day, after `NGHTTP2_REFUSED_STREAM`. Both came from the
TypeScript path, where the typed cause is lost at the WASM boundary and only
text survives, and both were transport failures a signal list derived from
Rust wording had never seen.
The submission itself is a separate matter and not a defect: an outcome the
node never confirmed is exactly what the client must refuse to record.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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--upgrade-from+--scenario(the pairing the usage text recommends) passes--filteredtwice to the seed phase: once fromDRIVER_ARGS(run.sh:414) and once fromSEED_SCENARIOS(run.sh:436). clap rejects it (the argument '--filtered' cannot be used multiple times, confirmed with the binary), the seed is skipped with a "note", anddet-restart-durabilitythen fails as a product failure on an empty database. CI never passes--scenario, so only local users hit it.- The live classifier applies the SDK's fallback vocabulary (
unavailable,timeout, …) to the driver's composed reason (environment.rs:66). live.rs:787 writesdelta history unavailable: {error}, so a GUARDIAN 500 on delta history classifies asenvironmentand stops blocking the nightly conclusion. Probed:…delta history unavailable: gRPC Internal server errorand…timeout waiting for quorum…both come back environmental. Classify on the caught error chain, or keep fallback words out of driver-composed text.
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Closes #432.
Adds a black-box qualification suite that drives Guardian from the outside through both consumer SDKs, and is explicit about what a given run is entitled to claim.
What it does
Two profiles:
deterministicliveBoth SDKs run the same scenario manifest, so a Rust/TypeScript divergence surfaces as one leg passing and the other failing rather than as an untested gap. That is how most of the findings below were caught.
43 scenarios (28 live, 15 deterministic) over 48 actions, expanding to 67 SDK executions; 42 are required. 24 of the 28 live scenarios run on both SDKs. Coverage: account creation (public and private, Falcon and ECDSA), funding, note consumption, signer add and remove, removed-signer refusal, threshold change, per-procedure override and its survival across a threshold change, asset send, P2ID and timelocked P2IDE, offline export/import, cross-SDK handoff both directions, GUARDIAN rotation offline and online, producer-supplied proposals and the abandon control, account pausing against a live chain, registration scheme gates, error-envelope shape, operator session/denial/logout/allowlist reload, post-restart and post-upgrade durability, and negative controls.
Layout
A run refuses to overclaim
This is the part worth reviewing hardest, because it is what makes a green run mean anything:
none, notfull.all()is vacuously true on an empty iterator, and a live profile with no network resolves to exactly that setSkippedtreated as the absence of a verdict, so neither pass can mask the otherTelling the network apart from the product
A live run drives a public Miden network and a remote prover, neither under this repository's control. Three consecutive runs reported dropped connections and prover deadlines as
productfailures, which with the treasury armed and a nightly scheduled would page as a defect.On the live profile only, a failure whose evidence points at the link is classified
environment, which does not block the conclusion. The rule is the SDK clients' own transient-error classifier unchanged: permanent status evidence anywhere vetoes transient evidence anywhere. A quorum refusing an under-signed proposal still fails asproduct. Both drivers are pinned tofixtures/qualification/environment-classification.json, holding verbatim reasons from real runs on both sides of the line, and every run prints what it lost to the network.The completion rule is falsified, not just asserted
Completion is chain confirmation plus a canonical delta at the proposal's own nonce, and not "the proposal left the pending set", because canonicalization removes a discarded delta exactly as it removes a successful one. Matching on the commitment alone asks "is this account in a state some canonical delta explains", which an account whose delta was discarded satisfies just as well: it never moved, so it still agrees with chain and the previous delta still carries that commitment. Both drivers fail closed when the nonce cannot be read, because the read that supplies it happens before executing, and a failure there is exactly when the unbound comparison would wrongly confirm.
live-custom-proposal-1of1-ecdsacarries the negative control: it abandons a candidate that can never land, checks the discard is invisible to what a client reads by default, and then asks the completion helper itself about a delta that really was discarded. The candidate comes from the producer API, the one path that separates acknowledgement from submission:prepare_custom_executionpushes the delta to obtain the acknowledgement, andsubmit_transactionis a separate call. Every step is a supported public call. The control caught the unbound comparison in both drivers.Cross-SDK divergences this found
Each of these is one leg passing and the other failing on the same scenario, against the same GUARDIAN, minutes apart:
live-p2ide-timelock-1of1-ecdsaasserts. Neither a status listing nor an availability listing returned it on the TypeScript side three minutes after the transaction canonicalized, while its own output-note record was committed throughout. The TypeScript leg reads the landing from the sending side, which keeps the pair intact. Whether a TypeScript consumer can ever consume a note it sent itself is not answered here, and is worth answeringsyncProposalsdoes fetch, but rebuilds the proposal from its own cached metadata when it has some, so a label GUARDIAN mangled would read back correctly on the proposing client and wrongly on every other one. The Rust client decodes GUARDIAN's answer either wayProduct fixes included
build_update_signersnow handles itload()returned an account whose reads came from a stale local store; reconciliation is now one shared rule soloadandsyncStatecannot drift, and it refuses to overwrite state for an account that has transacted, and to adopt state that disagrees with chainverify_endpoint_commitmentasked for a pubkey without a scheme, so an ECDSA account could never satisfy the check. Landed separately as fix(multisig-client): bind the endpoint commitment check to the account's scheme #479, now inmainWhy the deterministic workflow is still dispatch-only
Its required scenarios pass. What is left is that it has not run green on a Linux runner, which cannot happen until this lands and the workflow exists on
main, and the rule that a gate should be seen to go red on a real defect before anything depends on it. It has gone red several times, though each was found by adding or tightening a scenario rather than by catching a regression in existing coverage, so whether that clears the bar is a judgement for whoever owns the gate.The live profile runs nightly against
qualification-devnetandqualification-testnet, which exist, holdQUAL_TREASURY_KEYand are branch-locked tomain. Qualifying a non-default ref still needs the treasury handoff, which is not built.State
Both profiles have a full-width green run behind them, not only per-scenario smoke runs:
success, claimfull. 27 Rust, 25 TypeScript, ~30 minutesoperator-audit, specified and unimplemented, so it is optional), claimfullv0.17.0The live run's leg durations are worth a glance, because they are the evidence it was not vacuous: the custom-proposal and abandon control takes 3m50s on Rust and 4m3s on TypeScript, which is the abandon quarantine and the completion deadline genuinely being waited out, while the six legs that finish in under a second are the three scenarios whose actions never touch the chain (
account-create account-register commitment-verifyand the cosigner recovery).crates/server/migrations/, and is refused on the live profile, where it would fund every scenario twiceSummary by CodeRabbit