Laughlin Task Mapping Question Megathread

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Use this thread to ask questions about task mapping related to Laughlin (1980 and later work).

As a summary and overview, you can refresh yourself on Laughlin's ideas by reading this passage from Larson (2010):

Laughlin (1980; 1999; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) has proposed that cooperative problem-solving tasks can be meaningfully arrayed on a continuum anchored at one end by purely intellective tasks and at the other by purely judgmental tasks. Purely intellective tasks are those for which the correctness of a proposed solution can be readily demonstrated. A simple algebra problem is a good example. Anyone who knows the rules of algebra should be able to assess whether or not a proposed solution is, in fact, correct. Purely judgmental tasks, on the other hand, are tasks for which there is no demonstrably correct answer. Such tasks require an evaluative, behavioral, or aesthetic judgment that establishes—as opposed to matches—what is correct. A good example is the task faced by the awards committee in a juried art show. What criteria should this committee use when deciding which painting or sculpture is best? Should they consider the technical difficulty of the work? Its originality? The degree to which the work is emotionally expressive? Or how about its social relevance? A case might be made for any of these. It is up to the committee to decide which criteria will be used, how they will be weighted, and so which piece of art will be judged best.

There are, of course, many tasks that are intermediate between these two extremes, being neither purely intellective nor purely judgmental. For such tasks, demonstrating the correctness of a proposed solution is more difficult, but not impossible. It seems more difficult, for example, to demonstrate the correctness of the answer to the transfer task given in Figure 2.1 (i.e., to show that that answer involves the fewest possible transfers needed to divide the milk into two equal portions) than to demonstrate the correctness of an answer to a simple algebra problem. Still, a demonstration is possible.

Finally, there are some tasks that seem simultaneously to possess both intellective and judgmental elements. An example is inductive hypoth- esis testing (Laughlin, 1999, Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995). Inductive hypothesis testing is arguably the core activity in any empirical science. Given some body of evidence, every pertinent hypothesis (e.g., about a causal relationship between two variables) is either consistent or incon- sistent with that evidence. All consistent hypotheses are plausibly correct, whereas inconsistent hypotheses are not. Implausible hypotheses are demonstrably incorrect by virtue of their inconsistency with available evi- dence. Thus, evaluating implausible hypotheses is an intellective subtask.

Evaluating plausible hypotheses, on the other hand, is a judgmental subtask. This is because all possible plausible hypotheses are (by definition) consistent with the available evidence, and none can be shown to fit that evidence any better than others. Consequently, without additional data, there is no clear way to differentiate (demonstrate) the one plausible and correct hypothesis from other plausible but ultimately incorrect hypoth- eses. Thus, inductive hypothesis testing is intellective to the extent permit- ted by current evidence, but judgmental beyond that. Inductive hypothesis testing will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

The crucial dimension underlying the intellective-judgmental continuum is thus the demonstrability of proposed solutions. On its surface, this dimension appears to be similar to one of the 10 attributes that judges rated in Shaw’s (1963) study (i.e., Attribute 6 in Figure 2.2). But what makes the solution to a problem-solving task more or less demonstrable? Laughlin and Ellis (1986) argued that demonstrability depends on four conditions:

1. There must be group consensus on a conceptual system within which the problem can be solved.
2. There must be sufficient information available to solve the problem within that conceptual system.
3. Members who cannot solve the problem themselves must nevertheless have sufficient knowledge of the conceptual system and relevant task information to recognize a correct solution if one is proposed by another member.
4. Members who can solve the problem must have sufficient ability, moti- vation, and time to demonstrate the solution to the rest of the group.

Laughlin and Ellis (1986) suggest that mathematics is the preeminent domain of demonstrability. To illustrate, suppose a group is given the following problem: A = πr^2; If r is 5, what is A? If the group members agree that algebra is the relevant conceptual system for solving this problem (Condition 1), if those who cannot themselves solve the problem nevertheless understand enough algebra to follow an explanation offered by some- one else (Condition 3), and if those who can solve the problem are willing and able to explain their solution (Condition 4), then given that there is sufficient information to solve this problem (i.e., it involves a single equation in one unknown, which is solvable, as opposed to, for example, being a single equation in two unknowns, which is not solvable; Condition 2), the solution should be fully demonstrable. Under such conditions, if a correct solution is proposed and demonstrated by anyone in the group (A = 78.5), the rest of the group should recognized its correctness and so adopt it as their collective answer.

References:
Laughlin, P. R. (1980). Social combination processes of cooperative problem-solving groups on verbal intellective tasks. In M. Fishbein (Ed.), Progress in social psychology (pp. 127–155). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Laughlin, P. R., & Ellis, A. L. (1986). Demonstrability and social combination processes on mathematical intellective tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 177–189.

Link to Paper:
Laughlin-1986.pdf