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22 | 22 | "metadata": {}, |
23 | 23 | "source": [ |
24 | 24 | ":::{attention}\n", |
25 | | - "If the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard relative to $\\mathcal{G}$, then [the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol $\\Pi$](#dhke) is [secure in the presence of an eavesdropper](#ke-eav) (with respect to [the modified experiment $\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\mathrm{eav}}$](#ke-exp) ).\n", |
| 25 | + "If [the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem](#ddh) is hard relative to $\\mathcal{G}$, then [the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol $\\Pi$](#dhke) is [secure in the presence of an eavesdropper](#ke-eav) (with respect to [the modified experiment $\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\mathrm{eav}}$](#ke-exp) ).\n", |
26 | 26 | ":::" |
27 | 27 | ] |
28 | 28 | }, |
|
31 | 31 | "id": "693f633f", |
32 | 32 | "metadata": {}, |
33 | 33 | "source": [ |
34 | | - "PROOF Let $\\mathcal{A}$ be a PPT adversary. Since $\\operatorname{Pr}[b=0]=\\operatorname{Pr}[b=1]=1 / 2$, we have\n", |
| 34 | + ":::{danger} PROOF \n", |
| 35 | + ":class: dropdown\n", |
| 36 | + "\n", |
| 37 | + "Let $\\mathcal{A}$ be a PPT adversary. Since $\\operatorname{Pr}[b=0]=\\operatorname{Pr}[b=1]=1 / 2$, we have\n", |
35 | 38 | "\n", |
36 | 39 | "$$\n", |
37 | 40 | "\\begin{aligned}\n", |
38 | 41 | "\\operatorname{Pr} & {\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)=1\\right] } \\\\\n", |
39 | 42 | "& =\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)=1 \\mid b=0\\right]+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)=1 \\mid b=1\\right]\n", |
40 | 43 | "\\end{aligned}\n", |
41 | | - "$$" |
| 44 | + "$$\n", |
| 45 | + "\n", |
| 46 | + "In experiment $\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)$ the adversary $\\mathcal{A}$ receives $\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, h_A, h_B, \\hat{k}\\right)$, where $\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, h_A, h_B\\right)$ represents the transcript of the protocol execution, and $\\hat{k}$ is either the actual key computed by the parties (if $b=0$ ) or a uniform group element (if $b=1$ ). Distinguishing between these two cases is exactly equivalent to solving the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. That is\n", |
| 47 | + "\n", |
| 48 | + "$$\n", |
| 49 | + "\\begin{aligned}\n", |
| 50 | + "& \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)=1\\right] \\\\\n", |
| 51 | + "& =\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)=1 \\mid b=0\\right]+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\text {eav }}(n)=1 \\mid b=1\\right] \\\\\n", |
| 52 | + "& =\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{x y}\\right)=0\\right]+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z\\right)=1\\right] \\\\\n", |
| 53 | + "& =\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot\\left(1-\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{x y}\\right)=1\\right]\\right)+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z\\right)=1\\right] \\\\\n", |
| 54 | + "& =\\frac{1}{2}+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot\\left(\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z\\right)=1\\right]-\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{x y}\\right)=1\\right]\\right) \\\\\n", |
| 55 | + "& \\leq \\frac{1}{2}+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot\\left|\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z\\right)=1\\right]-\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{x y}\\right)=1\\right]\\right|\n", |
| 56 | + "\\end{aligned}\n", |
| 57 | + "$$\n", |
| 58 | + "\n", |
| 59 | + "where the probabilities are all taken over ( $\\mathbb{G}, q, g$ ) output by $\\mathcal{G}\\left(1^n\\right)$, and uniform choice of $x, y, z \\in \\mathbb{Z}_q$. (Note that since $g$ is a generator, $g^z$ is a uniform element of $\\mathbb{G}$ when $z$ is uniformly distributed in $\\mathbb{Z}_q$.) If the decisional DiffieHellman assumption is hard relative to $\\mathcal{G}$, that exactly means that there is a negligible function negl for which\n", |
| 60 | + "\n", |
| 61 | + "$$\n", |
| 62 | + "\\left|\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z\\right)=1\\right]-\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\mathcal{A}\\left(\\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{x y}\\right)=1\\right]\\right| \\leq \\operatorname{negl}(n)\n", |
| 63 | + "$$\n", |
| 64 | + "\n", |
| 65 | + "We conclude that\n", |
| 66 | + "\n", |
| 67 | + "$$\n", |
| 68 | + "\\operatorname{Pr}\\left[\\widehat{\\mathrm{KE}}_{\\mathcal{A}, \\Pi}^{\\mathrm{eav}}(n)=1\\right] \\leq \\frac{1}{2}+\\frac{1}{2} \\cdot \\operatorname{negl}(n),\n", |
| 69 | + "$$\n", |
| 70 | + "\n", |
| 71 | + "completing the proof.\n", |
| 72 | + ":::" |
42 | 73 | ] |
43 | 74 | } |
44 | 75 | ], |
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