diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index a5eb1dd..a4aaafe 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -2,3 +2,8 @@
 **Vulnerability:** The application was passing unvalidated HTML variables, specifically `citation.formattedHtml`, to React's `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` prop in multiple components (`src/components/wiki/sortable-citation.tsx`, `src/app/cite/page.tsx`, `src/app/share/[code]/page.tsx`).
 **Learning:** This is a classic pattern for Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). If a citation's contents originated from an untrusted source or were maliciously formatted, an attacker could execute arbitrary scripts in a user's session when the citation is rendered.
 **Prevention:** Always sanitize any untrusted or dynamic HTML before rendering it in React. In a Next.js (SSR) application, use a library like `isomorphic-dompurify` to safely strip malicious scripts from the HTML payload on both the client and server side without hydration errors.
+
+## 2025-02-28 - [SSRF via Native Node.js fetch in URL Lookup]
+**Vulnerability:** The `/api/lookup/url` endpoint takes a user-supplied URL and makes a server-side request using native `fetch()` without any validation of the target IP address. This allowed basic Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) where attackers could query internal networks (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1` or AWS metadata `http://169.254.169.254`).
+**Learning:** Native `fetch()` does not automatically protect against local network requests. When performing pre-fetch DNS validation, modifying the URL directly to use an IP address can break TLS SNI.
+**Prevention:** Always validate resolved IP addresses before executing requests to untrusted URLs. Added an `isPrivateIP` check after doing a DNS lookup. Advanced prevention for full DNS rebinding with SNI support would require custom HTTP dispatchers (like `undici`), but basic pre-fetch DNS lookup provides a strong first line of defense.
diff --git a/src/app/api/lookup/url/route.ts b/src/app/api/lookup/url/route.ts
index e01d434..8f5b7c1 100644
--- a/src/app/api/lookup/url/route.ts
+++ b/src/app/api/lookup/url/route.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
 import type { SourceType } from '@/types';
+import { lookup } from 'dns/promises';
 
 interface MetadataResult {
   title?: string;
@@ -54,6 +55,45 @@ interface APIResponse {
   error?: string;
 }
 
+
+/**
+ * Check if an IP address is private/local.
+ */
+function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
+
+  // IPv6 unspecified address
+  if (ip === '::') return true;
+
+  // IPv6 loopback
+
+  if (ip === '::1') return true;
+
+  // IPv6 unique local address
+  if (ip.match(/^(fc|fd)/i)) return true;
+
+  // IPv6 link-local address
+  if (ip.match(/^fe80/i)) return true;
+
+  // IPv4 mapping
+  if (ip.startsWith('::ffff:')) {
+    ip = ip.replace('::ffff:', '');
+  }
+
+  const parts = ip.split('.');
+  if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
+
+  const numParts = parts.map(Number);
+
+  return (
+    numParts[0] === 10 || // 10.0.0.0/8
+    (numParts[0] === 172 && numParts[1] >= 16 && numParts[1] <= 31) || // 172.16.0.0/12
+    (numParts[0] === 192 && numParts[1] === 168) || // 192.168.0.0/16
+    numParts[0] === 127 || // 127.0.0.0/8
+    numParts[0] === 0 || // 0.0.0.0/8
+    (numParts[0] === 169 && numParts[1] === 254) // 169.254.0.0/16
+  );
+}
+
 export async function POST(request: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse<APIResponse>> {
   try {
     const body = await request.json();
@@ -77,9 +117,27 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse<APIRespon
       );
     }
 
+
     // Detect the source type from the URL and grab any type-specific hints
     const detection = detectSourceTypeFromUrl(parsedUrl);
 
+    // SSRF Protection: Pre-fetch DNS validation
+    try {
+      const { address } = await lookup(parsedUrl.hostname);
+      if (isPrivateIP(address)) {
+        return NextResponse.json(
+          { success: false, error: 'Access to internal networks is not allowed' },
+          { status: 403 }
+        );
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        { success: false, error: 'Failed to resolve hostname' },
+        { status: 400 }
+      );
+    }
+
+
     // For arXiv URLs, short-circuit to the arXiv API which gives richer metadata
     if (detection.sourceType === 'preprint' && detection.arxivId) {
       const arxivData = await fetchArxivMetadata(detection.arxivId);