added newline at end of file

RRudder · RRudder · commit eabf84760bc0 · 2026-03-31T11:18:42.000+10:00
MD047/single-trailing-newline Files should end with a single newline character
diff --git a/submissions/description/insufficient_security_configurability/weak_jwt_hashing_algorithm/recommendations.md b/submissions/description/insufficient_security_configurability/weak_jwt_hashing_algorithm/recommendations.md
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
 
 Implement a strong asymmetric signing algorithm such as RS256 or ES256 with properly managed keys, or use HS256 with a cryptographically random secret of at least 256 bits and never exposed in client-side code. 
 
-Explicitly reject the none algorithm in the JWT validation logic. Validate the alg header against a server-side allowlist and reject tokens with unexpected algorithms. If using a symmetric algorithm, ensure the signing secret is at least 256 bits of cryptographically random data and is never exposed in client-side code.
+Explicitly reject the none algorithm in the JWT validation logic. Validate the alg header against a server-side allowlist and reject tokens with unexpected algorithms. If using a symmetric algorithm, ensure the signing secret is at least 256 bits of cryptographically random data and is never exposed in client-side code.

Original file line number	Diff line number	Diff line change
`@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@`
`2`	`2`
`3`	`3`	`Implement a strong asymmetric signing algorithm such as RS256 or ES256 with properly managed keys, or use HS256 with a cryptographically random secret of at least 256 bits and never exposed in client-side code.`
`4`	`4`
`5`		`-Explicitly reject the none algorithm in the JWT validation logic. Validate the alg header against a server-side allowlist and reject tokens with unexpected algorithms. If using a symmetric algorithm, ensure the signing secret is at least 256 bits of cryptographically random data and is never exposed in client-side code.`
	`5`	`+Explicitly reject the none algorithm in the JWT validation logic. Validate the alg header against a server-side allowlist and reject tokens with unexpected algorithms. If using a symmetric algorithm, ensure the signing secret is at least 256 bits of cryptographically random data and is never exposed in client-side code.`