From e6e220a64fd39ffed389d2b55a94cd1ce4754aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:23:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/11] crypto: seqiv - Handle EBUSY correctly jira VULN-155738 cve CVE-2023-53373 commit-author Herbert Xu commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc As it is seqiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of seqiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu (cherry picked from commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- crypto/seqiv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c index 86bb33644dd0b..ae7256cfc77f1 100644 --- a/crypto/seqiv.c +++ b/crypto/seqiv.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err) struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req); struct crypto_aead *geniv; - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) return; if (err) From b3810d9babd30e3e195c8e6f3a30953207117a88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:23:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/11] Bluetooth: Fix potential use-after-free when clear keys jira VULN-155800 cve CVE-2023-53386 commit-author Min Li commit 3673952cf0c6cf81b06c66a0b788abeeb02ff3ae Similar to commit c5d2b6fa26b5 ("Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free in hci_remove_ltk/hci_remove_irk"). We can not access k after kfree_rcu() call. Fixes: d7d41682efc2 ("Bluetooth: Fix Suspicious RCU usage warnings") Signed-off-by: Min Li Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz (cherry picked from commit 3673952cf0c6cf81b06c66a0b788abeeb02ff3ae) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index bea64bb1bb08f..fd3145e81e87f 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -1074,9 +1074,9 @@ void hci_uuids_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct link_key *key; + struct link_key *key, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(key, &hdev->link_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &hdev->link_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&key->list); kfree_rcu(key, rcu); } @@ -1084,9 +1084,9 @@ void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct smp_ltk *k; + struct smp_ltk *k, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&k->list); kfree_rcu(k, rcu); } @@ -1094,9 +1094,9 @@ void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct smp_irk *k; + struct smp_irk *k, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&k->list); kfree_rcu(k, rcu); } @@ -1104,9 +1104,9 @@ void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) void hci_blocked_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct blocked_key *b; + struct blocked_key *b, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->blocked_keys, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(b, tmp, &hdev->blocked_keys, list) { list_del_rcu(&b->list); kfree_rcu(b, rcu); } From 2e93d67f01f6ec52ef107af663ef7ed246433eab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:23:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/11] mm: kmem: fix a NULL pointer dereference in obj_stock_flush_required() jira VULN-155869 cve CVE-2023-53401 commit-author Roman Gushchin commit 3b8abb3239530c423c0b97e42af7f7e856e1ee96 KCSAN found an issue in obj_stock_flush_required(): stock->cached_objcg can be reset between the check and dereference: ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in drain_all_stock / drain_obj_stock write to 0xffff888237c2a2f8 of 8 bytes by task 19625 on cpu 0: drain_obj_stock+0x408/0x4e0 mm/memcontrol.c:3306 refill_obj_stock+0x9c/0x1e0 mm/memcontrol.c:3340 obj_cgroup_uncharge+0xe/0x10 mm/memcontrol.c:3408 memcg_slab_free_hook mm/slab.h:587 [inline] __cache_free mm/slab.c:3373 [inline] __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3577 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x105/0x280 mm/slab.c:3602 __d_free fs/dcache.c:298 [inline] dentry_free fs/dcache.c:375 [inline] __dentry_kill+0x422/0x4a0 fs/dcache.c:621 dentry_kill+0x8d/0x1e0 dput+0x118/0x1f0 fs/dcache.c:913 __fput+0x3bf/0x570 fs/file_table.c:329 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x123/0x160 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xcf/0xe0 kernel/entry/common.c:171 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x6a/0xa0 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd read to 0xffff888237c2a2f8 of 8 bytes by task 19632 on cpu 1: obj_stock_flush_required mm/memcontrol.c:3319 [inline] drain_all_stock+0x174/0x2a0 mm/memcontrol.c:2361 try_charge_memcg+0x6d0/0xd10 mm/memcontrol.c:2703 try_charge mm/memcontrol.c:2837 [inline] mem_cgroup_charge_skmem+0x51/0x140 mm/memcontrol.c:7290 sock_reserve_memory+0xb1/0x390 net/core/sock.c:1025 sk_setsockopt+0x800/0x1e70 net/core/sock.c:1525 udp_lib_setsockopt+0x99/0x6c0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2692 udp_setsockopt+0x73/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2817 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3668 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c3/0x230 net/socket.c:2271 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2282 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2279 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2279 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0xffff8881382d52c0 -> 0xffff888138893740 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 19632 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-syzkaller-00387-g534293368afa #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 Fix it by using READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for all accesses to stock->cached_objcg. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230502160839.361544-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev Fixes: bf4f059954dc ("mm: memcg/slab: obj_cgroup API") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin Reported-by: syzbot+774c29891415ab0fd29d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CACT4Y+ZfucZhM60YPphWiCLJr6+SGFhT+jjm8k1P-a_8Kkxsjg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed Acked-by: Shakeel Butt Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton (cherry picked from commit 3b8abb3239530c423c0b97e42af7f7e856e1ee96) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- mm/memcontrol.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 035a23603b31b..e5c776740504e 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -3142,12 +3142,12 @@ void mod_objcg_state(struct obj_cgroup *objcg, struct pglist_data *pgdat, * accumulating over a page of vmstat data or when pgdat or idx * changes. */ - if (stock->cached_objcg != objcg) { + if (READ_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg) != objcg) { old = drain_obj_stock(stock); obj_cgroup_get(objcg); stock->nr_bytes = atomic_read(&objcg->nr_charged_bytes) ? atomic_xchg(&objcg->nr_charged_bytes, 0) : 0; - stock->cached_objcg = objcg; + WRITE_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg, objcg); stock->cached_pgdat = pgdat; } else if (stock->cached_pgdat != pgdat) { /* Flush the existing cached vmstat data */ @@ -3201,7 +3201,7 @@ static bool consume_obj_stock(struct obj_cgroup *objcg, unsigned int nr_bytes) local_lock_irqsave(&memcg_stock.stock_lock, flags); stock = this_cpu_ptr(&memcg_stock); - if (objcg == stock->cached_objcg && stock->nr_bytes >= nr_bytes) { + if (objcg == READ_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg) && stock->nr_bytes >= nr_bytes) { stock->nr_bytes -= nr_bytes; ret = true; } @@ -3213,7 +3213,7 @@ static bool consume_obj_stock(struct obj_cgroup *objcg, unsigned int nr_bytes) static struct obj_cgroup *drain_obj_stock(struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock) { - struct obj_cgroup *old = stock->cached_objcg; + struct obj_cgroup *old = READ_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg); if (!old) return NULL; @@ -3266,7 +3266,7 @@ static struct obj_cgroup *drain_obj_stock(struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock) stock->cached_pgdat = NULL; } - stock->cached_objcg = NULL; + WRITE_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg, NULL); /* * The `old' objects needs to be released by the caller via * obj_cgroup_put() outside of memcg_stock_pcp::stock_lock. @@ -3277,10 +3277,11 @@ static struct obj_cgroup *drain_obj_stock(struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock) static bool obj_stock_flush_required(struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock, struct mem_cgroup *root_memcg) { + struct obj_cgroup *objcg = READ_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg); struct mem_cgroup *memcg; - if (stock->cached_objcg) { - memcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(stock->cached_objcg); + if (objcg) { + memcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg); if (memcg && mem_cgroup_is_descendant(memcg, root_memcg)) return true; } @@ -3299,10 +3300,10 @@ static void refill_obj_stock(struct obj_cgroup *objcg, unsigned int nr_bytes, local_lock_irqsave(&memcg_stock.stock_lock, flags); stock = this_cpu_ptr(&memcg_stock); - if (stock->cached_objcg != objcg) { /* reset if necessary */ + if (READ_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg) != objcg) { /* reset if necessary */ old = drain_obj_stock(stock); obj_cgroup_get(objcg); - stock->cached_objcg = objcg; + WRITE_ONCE(stock->cached_objcg, objcg); stock->nr_bytes = atomic_read(&objcg->nr_charged_bytes) ? atomic_xchg(&objcg->nr_charged_bytes, 0) : 0; allow_uncharge = true; /* Allow uncharge when objcg changes */ From 44fcf9c8da3c8a75d632b7e92c84f2f46ffce029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:23:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/11] crypto: xts - Handle EBUSY correctly jira VULN-157048 cve CVE-2023-53494 commit-author Herbert Xu commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40 As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu (cherry picked from commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- crypto/xts.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c index 6c12f30dbdd6d..9f90121b69994 100644 --- a/crypto/xts.c +++ b/crypto/xts.c @@ -203,12 +203,12 @@ static void xts_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err) if (!err) { struct xts_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); - rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + rctx->subreq.base.flags &= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG; err = xts_xor_tweak_post(req, true); if (!err && unlikely(req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)) { err = xts_cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_encrypt); - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) return; } } @@ -223,12 +223,12 @@ static void xts_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err) if (!err) { struct xts_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); - rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + rctx->subreq.base.flags &= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG; err = xts_xor_tweak_post(req, false); if (!err && unlikely(req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)) { err = xts_cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_decrypt); - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) return; } } From 5bbd5cd6f53bee8fe7f65f1a8d475ab5c83ebf8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:23:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/11] nbd: fix incomplete validation of ioctl arg jira VULN-157133 cve CVE-2023-53513 commit-author Zhong Jinghua commit 55793ea54d77719a071b1ccc05a05056e3b5e009 We tested and found an alarm caused by nbd_ioctl arg without verification. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/buffer.c:1709:35 signed integer overflow: -9223372036854775808 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'long long int' CPU: 3 PID: 2523 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3f0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:78 show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:158 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x170/0x1dc lib/dump_stack.c:118 ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0xb4 lib/ubsan.c:161 handle_overflow+0x188/0x1dc lib/ubsan.c:192 __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow+0x34/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:206 __block_write_full_page+0x94c/0xa20 fs/buffer.c:1709 block_write_full_page+0x1f0/0x280 fs/buffer.c:2934 blkdev_writepage+0x34/0x40 fs/block_dev.c:607 __writepage+0x68/0xe8 mm/page-writeback.c:2305 write_cache_pages+0x44c/0xc70 mm/page-writeback.c:2240 generic_writepages+0xdc/0x148 mm/page-writeback.c:2329 blkdev_writepages+0x2c/0x38 fs/block_dev.c:2114 do_writepages+0xd4/0x250 mm/page-writeback.c:2344 The reason for triggering this warning is __block_write_full_page() -> i_size_read(inode) - 1 overflow. inode->i_size is assigned in __nbd_ioctl() -> nbd_set_size() -> bytesize. We think it is necessary to limit the size of arg to prevent errors. Moreover, __nbd_ioctl() -> nbd_add_socket(), arg will be cast to int. Assuming the value of arg is 0x80000000000000001) (on a 64-bit machine), it will become 1 after the coercion, which will return unexpected results. Fix it by adding checks to prevent passing in too large numbers. Signed-off-by: Zhong Jinghua Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230206145805.2645671-1-zhongjinghua@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe (cherry picked from commit 55793ea54d77719a071b1ccc05a05056e3b5e009) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index 2a2a1d996a57a..d76f8b9b214f9 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -327,6 +327,9 @@ static int nbd_set_size(struct nbd_device *nbd, loff_t bytesize, if (blk_validate_block_size(blksize)) return -EINVAL; + if (bytesize < 0) + return -EINVAL; + nbd->config->bytesize = bytesize; nbd->config->blksize_bits = __ffs(blksize); @@ -1112,6 +1115,9 @@ static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg, struct nbd_sock *nsock; int err; + /* Arg will be cast to int, check it to avoid overflow */ + if (arg > INT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; sock = nbd_get_socket(nbd, arg, &err); if (!sock) return err; From 24c2fb6c792d46c3a28aaf8ccad4d76bd2488208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:24:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/11] ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 power domain descriptors, too jira VULN-136374 cve CVE-2025-38729 commit-author Takashi Iwai commit d832ccbc301fbd9e5a1d691bdcf461cdb514595f UAC3 power domain descriptors need to be verified with its variable bLength for avoiding the unexpected OOB accesses by malicious firmware, too. Fixes: 9a2fe9b801f5 ("ALSA: usb: initial USB Audio Device Class 3.0 support") Reported-and-tested-by: Youngjun Lee Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250814081245.8902-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit d832ccbc301fbd9e5a1d691bdcf461cdb514595f) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- sound/usb/validate.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/usb/validate.c b/sound/usb/validate.c index 6fe206f6e9110..4f4e8e87a14cd 100644 --- a/sound/usb/validate.c +++ b/sound/usb/validate.c @@ -221,6 +221,17 @@ static bool validate_uac3_feature_unit(const void *p, return d->bLength >= sizeof(*d) + 4 + 2; } +static bool validate_uac3_power_domain_unit(const void *p, + const struct usb_desc_validator *v) +{ + const struct uac3_power_domain_descriptor *d = p; + + if (d->bLength < sizeof(*d)) + return false; + /* baEntities[] + wPDomainDescrStr */ + return d->bLength >= sizeof(*d) + d->bNrEntities + 2; +} + static bool validate_midi_out_jack(const void *p, const struct usb_desc_validator *v) { @@ -285,6 +296,7 @@ static const struct usb_desc_validator audio_validators[] = { struct uac3_clock_multiplier_descriptor), /* UAC_VERSION_3, UAC3_SAMPLE_RATE_CONVERTER: not implemented yet */ /* UAC_VERSION_3, UAC3_CONNECTORS: not implemented yet */ + FUNC(UAC_VERSION_3, UAC3_POWER_DOMAIN, validate_uac3_power_domain_unit), { } /* terminator */ }; From 83e7474a60b9faccc2d747ee43ba0191c531f086 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:24:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/11] ipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time jira VULN-136546 cve CVE-2025-39702 commit-author Eric Biggers commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this. Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818202724.15713-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski (cherry picked from commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c index 687d95dce0852..086950b83edf1 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output)) return false; - if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0) + if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN)) return false; return true; From e715f1bd05be1222c06214ca058a8baf2513c189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:24:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/11] NFS: Fix filehandle bounds checking in nfs_fh_to_dentry() jira VULN-136579 cve CVE-2025-39730 commit-author Trond Myklebust commit ef93a685e01a281b5e2a25ce4e3428cf9371a205 The function needs to check the minimal filehandle length before it can access the embedded filehandle. Reported-by: zhangjian Fixes: 20fa19027286 ("nfs: add export operations") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust (cherry picked from commit ef93a685e01a281b5e2a25ce4e3428cf9371a205) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- fs/nfs/export.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/export.c b/fs/nfs/export.c index 01596f2d0a1ed..0ad412ab10f65 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/export.c +++ b/fs/nfs/export.c @@ -66,14 +66,21 @@ nfs_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb, struct fid *fid, { struct nfs_fattr *fattr = NULL; struct nfs_fh *server_fh = nfs_exp_embedfh(fid->raw); - size_t fh_size = offsetof(struct nfs_fh, data) + server_fh->size; + size_t fh_size = offsetof(struct nfs_fh, data); const struct nfs_rpc_ops *rpc_ops; struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *inode; - int len = EMBED_FH_OFF + XDR_QUADLEN(fh_size); + int len = EMBED_FH_OFF; u32 *p = fid->raw; int ret; + /* Initial check of bounds */ + if (fh_len < len + XDR_QUADLEN(fh_size) || + fh_len > XDR_QUADLEN(NFS_MAXFHSIZE)) + return NULL; + /* Calculate embedded filehandle size */ + fh_size += server_fh->size; + len += XDR_QUADLEN(fh_size); /* NULL translates to ESTALE */ if (fh_len < len || fh_type != len) return NULL; From 3e0e5b14d898cd8085f505e2b58b23015cc70b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:24:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 09/11] ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 cluster segment descriptors jira VULN-152938 cve CVE-2025-39757 commit-author Takashi Iwai commit ecfd41166b72b67d3bdeb88d224ff445f6163869 UAC3 class segment descriptors need to be verified whether their sizes match with the declared lengths and whether they fit with the allocated buffer sizes, too. Otherwise malicious firmware may lead to the unexpected OOB accesses. Fixes: 11785ef53228 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Initial Power Domain support") Reported-and-tested-by: Youngjun Lee Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250814081245.8902-2-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit ecfd41166b72b67d3bdeb88d224ff445f6163869) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- sound/usb/stream.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/stream.c b/sound/usb/stream.c index f10f4e6d3fb85..6185da05a9189 100644 --- a/sound/usb/stream.c +++ b/sound/usb/stream.c @@ -338,20 +338,28 @@ snd_pcm_chmap_elem *convert_chmap_v3(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor len = le16_to_cpu(cluster->wLength); c = 0; - p += sizeof(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor); + p += sizeof(*cluster); + len -= sizeof(*cluster); - while (((p - (void *)cluster) < len) && (c < channels)) { + while (len > 0 && (c < channels)) { struct uac3_cluster_segment_descriptor *cs_desc = p; u16 cs_len; u8 cs_type; + if (len < sizeof(*p)) + break; cs_len = le16_to_cpu(cs_desc->wLength); + if (len < cs_len) + break; cs_type = cs_desc->bSegmentType; if (cs_type == UAC3_CHANNEL_INFORMATION) { struct uac3_cluster_information_segment_descriptor *is = p; unsigned char map; + if (cs_len < sizeof(*is)) + break; + /* * TODO: this conversion is not complete, update it * after adding UAC3 values to asound.h @@ -453,6 +461,7 @@ snd_pcm_chmap_elem *convert_chmap_v3(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor chmap->map[c++] = map; } p += cs_len; + len -= cs_len; } if (channels < c) @@ -873,7 +882,7 @@ snd_usb_get_audioformat_uac3(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, u64 badd_formats = 0; unsigned int num_channels; struct audioformat *fp; - u16 cluster_id, wLength; + u16 cluster_id, wLength, cluster_wLength; int clock = 0; int err; @@ -1000,6 +1009,16 @@ snd_usb_get_audioformat_uac3(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } + cluster_wLength = le16_to_cpu(cluster->wLength); + if (cluster_wLength < sizeof(*cluster) || + cluster_wLength > wLength) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, + "%u:%d : invalid Cluster Descriptor size\n", + iface_no, altno); + kfree(cluster); + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + } + num_channels = cluster->bNrChannels; chmap = convert_chmap_v3(cluster); kfree(cluster); From 527502dfc7cc45004e194d54f3943a82dd78d67e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 14:02:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 10/11] ALSA: usb-audio: Fix size validation in convert_chmap_v3() jira VULN-152938 cve-bf CVE-2025-39757 commit-author Dan Carpenter commit 89f0addeee3cb2dc49837599330ed9c4612f05b0 The "p" pointer is void so sizeof(*p) is 1. The intent was to check sizeof(*cs_desc), which is 3, instead. Fixes: ecfd41166b72 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 cluster segment descriptors") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKL5kftC1qGt6lpv@stanley.mountain Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit 89f0addeee3cb2dc49837599330ed9c4612f05b0) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- sound/usb/stream.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/stream.c b/sound/usb/stream.c index 6185da05a9189..ecd409e1c5ce9 100644 --- a/sound/usb/stream.c +++ b/sound/usb/stream.c @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ snd_pcm_chmap_elem *convert_chmap_v3(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor u16 cs_len; u8 cs_type; - if (len < sizeof(*p)) + if (len < sizeof(*cs_desc)) break; cs_len = le16_to_cpu(cs_desc->wLength); if (len < cs_len) From e2fb3a6109185cd410b1ab1b121a3a4ae3915955 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 12:24:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 11/11] efivarfs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in efivarfs_d_compare jira VULN-155163 cve CVE-2025-39817 commit-author Li Nan commit a6358f8cf64850f3f27857b8ed8c1b08cfc4685c Observed on kernel 6.6 (present on master as well): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x98/0xd0 Call trace: kasan_check_range+0xe8/0x190 __asan_loadN+0x1c/0x28 memcmp+0x98/0xd0 efivarfs_d_compare+0x68/0xd8 __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare+0x178/0x218 __d_lookup_rcu+0x1f8/0x228 d_alloc_parallel+0x150/0x648 lookup_open.isra.0+0x5f0/0x8d0 open_last_lookups+0x264/0x828 path_openat+0x130/0x3f8 do_filp_open+0x114/0x248 do_sys_openat2+0x340/0x3c0 __arm64_sys_openat+0x120/0x1a0 If dentry->d_name.len < EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN , 'guid' can become negative, leadings to oob. The issue can be triggered by parallel lookups using invalid filename: T1 T2 lookup_open ->lookup simple_lookup d_add // invalid dentry is added to hash list lookup_open d_alloc_parallel __d_lookup_rcu __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu // invalid dentry can be retrieved ->d_compare efivarfs_d_compare // oob Fix it by checking 'guid' before cmp. Fixes: da27a24383b2 ("efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive") Signed-off-by: Li Nan Signed-off-by: Wu Guanghao Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel (cherry picked from commit a6358f8cf64850f3f27857b8ed8c1b08cfc4685c) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- fs/efivarfs/super.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/super.c b/fs/efivarfs/super.c index 15880a68faadc..271c87cd6049c 100644 --- a/fs/efivarfs/super.c +++ b/fs/efivarfs/super.c @@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ static int efivarfs_d_compare(const struct dentry *dentry, { int guid = len - EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN; + /* Parallel lookups may produce a temporary invalid filename */ + if (guid <= 0) + return 1; + if (name->len != len) return 1;