2026-06-01T06:21:21.684Z [DEBUG] Hooks: checkForNewResponses returning 0 responses
{"type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01QpMhRuyvuttrPNLoxPey29","type":"tool_result","content":"1\t---\n2\ttitle: Authentication Architecture\n3\tdescription: How AWF isolates LLM API tokens using a multi-container credential separation architecture.\n4\t---\n5\t\n6\tAWF implements a multi-layered security architecture to protect LLM API authentication tokens while providing transparent proxying for AI agent calls. This document explains the complete authentication flow, token isolation mechanisms, and network routing for both OpenAI/Codex and Anthropic/Claude APIs.\n7\t\n8\t:::note\n9\tAll LLM providers use identical credential isolation architecture. API keys are held exclusively in the api-proxy sidecar container (never in the agent container), and all providers route through the same Squid proxy for domain filtering. Providers are differentiated by port number and authentication header format:\n10\t\n11\t| Port | Provider | Auth header |\n12\t|-------|--------------------|---------------------------------|\n13\t| 10000 | OpenAI | `Authorization: Bearer` |\n14\t| 10001 | Anthropic (Claude) | `x-api-key` (static) or `Authorization: Bearer` (OIDC) |\n15\t| 10002 | GitHub Copilot | `Authorization: Bearer` |\n16\t| 10003 | Google Gemini | `x-goog-api-key` |\n17\t:::\n18\t\n19\t## Architecture components\n20\t\n21\tAWF uses a **3-container architecture** when API proxy mode is enabled:\n22\t\n23\t1. **Squid Proxy Container** (`172.30.0.10`) — L7 HTTP/HTTPS domain filtering\n24\t2. **API Proxy Sidecar Container** (`172.30.0.30`) — credential injection and isolation\n25\t3. **Agent Execution Container** (`172.30.0.20`) — user command execution environment\n26\t\n27\t```\n28\t┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n29\t│ HOST MACHINE │\n30\t│ │\n31\t│ AWF CLI reads environment: │\n32\t│ - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... │\n33\t│ - OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... │\n34\t│ │\n35\t│ Passes keys only to api-proxy container │\n36\t└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n37\t │\n38\t ├─────────────────────────────────────┐\n39\t │ │\n40\t ▼ ▼\n41\t┌──────────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐\n42\t│ API Proxy Container │ │ Agent Container │\n43\t│ 172.30.0.30 │ │ 172.30.0.20 │\n44\t│ │ │ │\n45\t│ Environment: │ │ Environment: │\n46\t│ ✓ OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... │ │ ✗ No ANTHROPIC_API_KEY │\n47\t│ ✓ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... │ │ ✗ No OPENAI_API_KEY │\n48\t│ ✓ HTTP_PROXY=172.30.0.10:3128 │ │ ✓ ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL= │\n49\t│ ✓ HTTPS_PROXY=172.30.0.10:3128 │ │ http://172.30.0.30:10001 │\n50\t│ │ │ ✓ OPENAI_BASE_URL= │"}]},"parent_tool_use_id":null,"session_id":"953db95d-d2d1-4eea-82d3-824cbb8e8091","uuid":"f2060356-a64f-47e7-b206-309f1c8c408b","timestamp":"2026-06-01T06:21:21.683Z","tool_use_result":{"type":"text","file":{"filePath":"/home/runner/work/gh-aw-firewall/gh-aw-firewall/docs/authentication-architecture.md","content":"---\ntitle: Authentication Architecture\ndescription: How AWF isolates LLM API tokens using a multi-container credential separation architecture.\n---\n\nAWF implements a multi-layered security architecture to protect LLM API authentication tokens while providing transparent proxying for AI agent calls. This document explains the complete authentication flow, token isolation mechanisms, and network routing for both OpenAI/Codex and Anthropic/Claude APIs.\n\n:::note\nAll LLM providers use identical credential isolation architecture. API keys are held exclusively in the api-proxy sidecar container (never in the agent container), and all providers route through the same Squid proxy for domain filtering. Providers are differentiated by port number and authentication header format:\n\n| Port | Provider | Auth header |\n|-------|--------------------|---------------------------------|\n| 10000 | OpenAI | `Authorization: Bearer` |\n| 10001 | Anthropic (Claude) | `x-api-key` (static) or `Authorization: Bearer` (OIDC) |\n| 10002 | GitHub Copilot | `Authorization: Bearer` |\n| 10003 | Google Gemini | `x-goog-api-key` |\n:::\n\n## Architecture components\n\nAWF uses a **3-container architecture** when API proxy mode is enabled:\n\n1. **Squid Proxy Container** (`172.30.0.10`) — L7 HTTP/HTTPS domain filtering\n2. **API Proxy Sidecar Container** (`172.30.0.30`) — credential injection and isolation\n3. **Agent Execution Container** (`172.30.0.20`) — user command execution environment\n\n```\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│ HOST MACHINE │\n│ │\n│ AWF CLI reads environment: │\n│ - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... │\n│ - OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... │\n│ │\n│ Passes keys only to api-proxy container │\n└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n │\n ├─────────────────────────────────────┐\n │ │\n ▼ ▼\n┌──────────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐\n│ API Proxy Container │ │ Agent Container │\n│ 172.30.0.30 │ │ 172.30.0.20 │\n│ │ │ │\n│ Environment: │ │ Environment: │\n│ ✓ OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... │ │ ✗ No ANTHROPIC_API_KEY │\n│ ✓ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... │ │ ✗ No OPENAI_API_KEY │\n│ ✓ HTTP_PROXY=172.30.0.10:3128 │ │ ✓ ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL= │\n│ ✓ HTTPS_PROXY=172.30.0.10:3128 │ │ http://172.30.0.30:10001 │\n│ │ │ ✓ OPENAI_BASE_URL= │","numLines":50,"startLine":1,"totalLines":771}}}
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2026-06-01T06:21:21.689Z [DEBUG] MCP server "safeoutputs": HTTP connection closed after 35s (cleanly)
2026-06-01T06:21:21.690Z [DEBUG] MCP server "safeoutputs": Cleared connection cache for reconnection
2026-06-01T06:21:21.693Z [DEBUG] LSP server manager shut down successfully
2026-06-01T06:21:21.695Z [DEBUG] MCP server "safeoutputs": HTTP connection dropped after 35s uptime
2026-06-01T06:21:21.695Z [DEBUG] MCP server "safeoutputs": Connection error: SSE stream disconnected: AbortError: The operation was aborted.
2026-06-01T06:21:21.695Z [DEBUG] MCP server "safeoutputs": Terminal connection error 1/3
2026-06-01T06:21:21.695Z [DEBUG] Cleaned up session snapshot: /home/runner/.claude/shell-snapshots/snapshot-bash-1780294854750-jj7nc0.sh
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