In a future CCADB policy update, we should consider adding guidance to promote further consistency with CA Owner PKI policy document (i.e., CP, CPS, or combined CP/CPS) scoping and applicability. The intended outcome is reduced ambiguity and compliance friction.
Rough Ideas (suggestions welcome):
- Any given policy should explicitly identify in-scope CAs, similar to the way Audit Attestation Letters currently do. Maybe certificate hashes or SPKIhashes in a standardized reporting format? Though this can be reconstructed using CCADB Reports - it should be more transparent. This is an example of good practice.
- Some PKI hierarchies maintain both a “use-case specific” CP/CPS (i.e., a CP/CPS that exclusively covers the policies and practices related to the issuance of server authentication certificates) and other policies applicable to other PKI use cases (e.g., A “multi-purpose” CP that covers Code Signing and S/MIME, a Code Signing CPS, and an S/MIME CPS). There should be a description of each document’s applicability - and how multiple co-existing policies relate to one another. The same should be true when externally-operated CA Owner policies exist in a hierarchy (e.g., how does an externally-operated subordinate CA’s CP/CPS relate to its certificate issuer’s? What is the order of precedence?).
In a future CCADB policy update, we should consider adding guidance to promote further consistency with CA Owner PKI policy document (i.e., CP, CPS, or combined CP/CPS) scoping and applicability. The intended outcome is reduced ambiguity and compliance friction.
Rough Ideas (suggestions welcome):