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+# Threat Scoring & Verdict Model
+
+## 1. Purpose
+
+This document proposes a clear and explainable model for calculating:
+
+- A numeric threat score (0–100)
+- A final verdict: benign, suspicious, or malicious
+
+The model aggregates results from multiple threat-intelligence providers while handling:
+- Conflicting signals
+- Missing or failed providers
+- Varying provider reliability
+
+This system is intended to support analyst decisions, not replace them.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Inputs
+
+Each provider response is treated as an independent signal and may include:
+
+- Provider name
+- Provider verdict: benign, suspicious, malicious, or unknown
+- Provider confidence: low, medium, high
+- Provider status: success, timeout, or error
+
+Providers that fail or timeout are excluded from scoring but noted for confidence reduction.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Signal Normalization
+
+All provider verdicts are normalized to a common numeric scale:
+
+| Provider Verdict | Normalized Score |
+|------------------|------------------|
+| Malicious        | 100              |
+| Suspicious       | 60               |
+| Unknown          | 30               |
+| Benign           | 0                |
+
+This ensures consistency across providers with different internal scoring systems.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Provider Weighting
+
+Not all providers are equally reliable.
+
+Each provider is assigned a trust weight:
+
+| Trust Level | Weight |
+|------------|--------|
+| High       | 1.0    |
+| Medium     | 0.7    |
+| Low        | 0.5    |
+
+Provider-reported confidence further adjusts impact:
+
+| Confidence | Multiplier |
+|-----------|------------|
+| High      | 1.0        |
+| Medium    | 0.75       |
+| Low       | 0.5        |
+
+Effective Weight = Trust Weight × Confidence Multiplier
+
+---
+
+## 5. Score Aggregation Logic
+
+Only successful provider responses are used.
+
+The final threat score is calculated as a weighted average:
+
+Final Score =
+Σ(normalized_score × effective_weight)
+-------------------------------------
+Σ(effective_weight)
+
+This guarantees the final score always lies between 0 and 100.
+
+### Conflicting Results Handling
+- Mixed benign and malicious signals pull the score toward the middle
+- High-trust malicious signals outweigh low-trust benign ones
+- No single provider can dominate the outcome
+
+---
+
+## 6. Verdict Thresholds
+
+The numeric score is mapped to a final verdict:
+
+| Score Range | Verdict     | Meaning |
+|------------|-------------|--------|
+| 0–29       | Benign      | No credible threat indicators |
+| 30–69      | Suspicious  | Mixed or uncertain signals |
+| 70–100    | Malicious   | Strong, corroborated threat |
+
+Thresholds are intentionally conservative.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Example Scenarios
+
+### Scenario 1: Strong Malicious Agreement
+
+Inputs:
+- Provider A: malicious, high confidence, high trust
+- Provider B: malicious, medium confidence, medium trust
+- Provider C: malicious, high confidence, medium trust
+
+Result:
+- Final Score: ~85
+- Verdict: malicious
+
+Reasoning:
+Multiple trusted providers independently agree.
+
+---
+
+### Scenario 2: Mixed Signals
+
+Inputs:
+- Provider A: benign, high confidence, high trust
+- Provider B: suspicious, medium confidence, medium trust
+- Provider C: malicious, low confidence, low trust
+
+Result:
+- Final Score: ~45
+- Verdict: suspicious
+
+Reasoning:
+Conflicting signals prevent a definitive conclusion.
+
+---
+
+### Scenario 3: Mostly Benign
+
+Inputs:
+- Provider A: benign, high confidence, high trust
+- Provider B: benign, medium confidence, medium trust
+- Provider C: suspicious, low confidence, low trust
+
+Result:
+- Final Score: ~15
+- Verdict: benign
+
+Reasoning:
+Strong benign consensus outweighs weak suspicious signals.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Edge Cases
+
+### Single Provider Available
+- Score is derived from the single provider
+- Confidence is reduced due to lack of corroboration
+- Verdict often remains suspicious unless confidence is very high
+
+---
+
+### All Providers Timeout or Fail
+- No score is calculated
+- Verdict is set to unknown
+- Manual review is recommended
+
+The system does not guess.
+
+---
+
+### Strongly Conflicting Results
+- Score trends toward the middle
+- Verdict becomes suspicious
+- Confidence is lowered
+
+This reflects real-world ambiguity.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Trade-offs & Rationale
+
+Why weighted averaging?
+- Simple and explainable
+- Avoids hard overrides
+- Scales well as providers are added
+
+Why a wide suspicious range?
+- Most real-world IOCs are ambiguous
+- Binary decisions increase false positives
+
+Why conservative defaults?
+- Security decisions have real consequences
+- Safer to flag uncertainty than over-commit
+
+---
+
+## 10. Future Improvements
+
+Possible extensions include:
+- Dynamic provider trust based on historical accuracy
+- Time-based decay for old intelligence
+- IOC-type-specific scoring (IP vs URL vs hash)
+- Analyst feedback loops
+
+---
+
+## Final Note
+
+This model prioritizes clarity, safety, and explainability.
+It is intentionally simple and suitable as a foundation for future refinement.
+
+This model prioritizes clarity, safety, and explainability.
+It is intentionally simple and suitable as a foundation for future refinement.