defense_evasion_cloudtrail_logging_deleted.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/05/26"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2021/07/20"
integration = "aws"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = "Identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail. An adversary may delete trails in an attempt to evade defenses."
false_positives = [
    """
    Trail deletions may be made by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent,
    and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Trail deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should
    be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
    """,
]
from = "now-60m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws*"]
interval = "10m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted"
note = """## Config

The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = [
    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteTrail.html",
    "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/delete-trail.html",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "7024e2a0-315d-4334-bb1a-441c593e16ab"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Cloud", "AWS", "Continuous Monitoring", "SecOps", "Log Auditing"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"

query = '''
event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:cloudtrail.amazonaws.com and event.action:DeleteTrail and event.outcome:success
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1562.001"
name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"