diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 5f65c6a..1278926 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -16,7 +16,15 @@ When querying DNSSEC enabled zones, it performs a full verification of the resou
 * Performs the cryptographic verification of the `RRSIG` of the `DNSKEY` RRset with the public KSK
 * Checks the validity period of the `RRSIG` records
 
-Following these cryptographic verifications, the package then validates the authentication chain by walking up the delegation chain, checking the public `DNSKEY` RRs against the `DS` records in each parent zone, up to the TLD zone.  (For a more in-depth description of how DNSSEC works, see [this guide](https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/how-dnssec-works/).)
+Following these cryptographic verifications, the package then validates the authentication chain by walking up the delegation chain, checking the public `DNSKEY` RRs against the `DS` records in each parent zone, up to the root zone.
+
+### Root Zone Trust Anchor
+
+The library includes the official IANA root zone trust anchor (KSK-2017, key tag 20326) to validate the root zone DNSKEY. This ensures that the entire chain of trust is verified all the way up to the root, preventing a misbehaving server from spoofing the DNS hierarchy.
+
+The root zone validation follows [RFC 4033](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4033) and [RFC 4034](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034) specifications for DNSSEC validation.
+
+(For a more in-depth description of how DNSSEC works, see [this guide](https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/how-dnssec-works/).)
 
 In case of any validation errors, the method returns a non-nil `err` value, and an empty result set.  
 
diff --git a/authchain.go b/authchain.go
index cf26c35..ae9dd03 100644
--- a/authchain.go
+++ b/authchain.go
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ func (authChain *AuthenticationChain) Populate(domainName string) error {
 // valid, it walks through the delegationChain checking the RRSIGs on
 // the DNSKEY and DS resource record sets, as well as correctness of each
 // delegation using the lower level methods in SignedZone.
-func (authChain *AuthenticationChain) Verify(answerRRset *RRSet) error {
+// The trustAnchor parameter is used to validate the root zone DNSKEY.
+func (authChain *AuthenticationChain) Verify(answerRRset *RRSet, trustAnchor *TrustAnchor) error {
 
 	signedZone := authChain.delegationChain[0]
 	if !signedZone.checkHasDnskeys() {
@@ -64,7 +65,8 @@ func (authChain *AuthenticationChain) Verify(answerRRset *RRSet) error {
 		return ErrInvalidRRsig
 	}
 
-	for _, signedZone := range authChain.delegationChain {
+	for i := range authChain.delegationChain {
+		signedZone := authChain.delegationChain[i]
 
 		if signedZone.dnskey.IsEmpty() {
 			log.Printf("DNSKEY RR does not exist on %s\n", signedZone.zone)
@@ -95,6 +97,15 @@ func (authChain *AuthenticationChain) Verify(answerRRset *RRSet) error {
 				log.Printf("DS does not validate: %s", err)
 				return ErrDsInvalid
 			}
+		} else {
+			// This is the root zone (no parent), validate against trust anchor
+			if signedZone.zone == "." {
+				err := trustAnchor.VerifyRootZone(signedZone)
+				if err != nil {
+					log.Printf("Root zone does not match trust anchor: %s\n", err)
+					return ErrRootZoneNotTrusted
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
diff --git a/goresolver.go b/goresolver.go
index baa8041..f4c8419 100644
--- a/goresolver.go
+++ b/goresolver.go
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ type Resolver struct {
 	timeNow         func() time.Time
 	dnsClient       *dns.Client
 	dnsClientConfig *dns.ClientConfig
+	trustAnchor     *TrustAnchor
 }
 
 // Errors returned by the verification/validation methods at all levels.
@@ -109,5 +110,12 @@ func NewResolver(resolvConf string) (res *Resolver, err error) {
 	}
 	resolver.queryFn = localQuery
 	resolver.timeNow = time.Now
+	
+	// Initialize the root zone trust anchor
+	resolver.trustAnchor, err = NewTrustAnchor()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	
 	return resolver, nil
 }
diff --git a/lookup.go b/lookup.go
index ae6cdad..cfef372 100644
--- a/lookup.go
+++ b/lookup.go
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func (resolver *Resolver) LookupIP(qname string) (ips []net.IP, err error) {
 	}
 	resultIPs := make([]net.IP, MaxReturnedIPAddressesCount)
 	for _, answer := range answers {
-		err = authChain.Verify(answer)
+		err = authChain.Verify(answer, resolver.trustAnchor)
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Printf("DNSSEC validation failed: %s\n", err)
 			continue
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func (resolver *Resolver) LookupIPType(qname string, qtype uint16) (ips []net.IP
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	err = authChain.Verify(answer)
+	err = authChain.Verify(answer, resolver.trustAnchor)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Printf("DNSSEC validation failed: %s\n", err)
 		return nil, err
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func (resolver *Resolver) StrictNSQuery(qname string, qtype uint16) (rrSet []dns
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	err = authChain.Verify(answer)
+	err = authChain.Verify(answer, resolver.trustAnchor)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Printf("DNSSEC validation failed: %s\n", err)
 		return nil, err
diff --git a/trustanchor.go b/trustanchor.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f7185f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/trustanchor.go
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package goresolver
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+)
+
+// ErrRootZoneNotTrusted is returned when the root zone DNSKEY does not
+// match any configured trust anchor
+var ErrRootZoneNotTrusted = errors.New("root zone DNSKEY does not match trust anchor")
+
+// TrustAnchor represents a DNSSEC trust anchor for the root zone
+type TrustAnchor struct {
+	dnskeys []*dns.DNSKEY
+}
+
+// defaultRootTrustAnchors contains the official IANA root zone trust anchors
+// These are the KSK (Key Signing Key) records for the root zone
+//
+// KSK-2017 (Key Tag 20326) - Currently active
+// Reference: https://www.iana.org/dnssec/files
+var defaultRootTrustAnchors = []string{
+	// KSK-2017 (Key Tag 20326)
+	". IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3+/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kvArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+eoZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfdRUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwNR1AkUTV74bU=",
+}
+
+// NewTrustAnchor creates a new TrustAnchor with the default root zone
+// trust anchors
+func NewTrustAnchor() (*TrustAnchor, error) {
+	ta := &TrustAnchor{
+		dnskeys: make([]*dns.DNSKEY, 0, len(defaultRootTrustAnchors)),
+	}
+
+	for _, anchor := range defaultRootTrustAnchors {
+		rr, err := dns.NewRR(anchor)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		dnskey, ok := rr.(*dns.DNSKEY)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, errors.New("trust anchor is not a DNSKEY record")
+		}
+		ta.dnskeys = append(ta.dnskeys, dnskey)
+	}
+
+	return ta, nil
+}
+
+// VerifyRootZone validates that the root zone DNSKEY matches one of the
+// configured trust anchors. It returns nil if validation succeeds.
+func (ta *TrustAnchor) VerifyRootZone(rootZone SignedZone) error {
+	if rootZone.zone != "." {
+		return errors.New("not a root zone")
+	}
+
+	// Check that at least one of the KSKs in the root zone matches
+	// a trust anchor
+	for _, trustAnchor := range ta.dnskeys {
+		trustAnchorKeyTag := trustAnchor.KeyTag()
+		
+		// Look up the key in the root zone by key tag
+		rootKey := rootZone.lookupPubKey(trustAnchorKeyTag)
+		if rootKey == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Compare the DNSKEY records
+		if keysMatch(trustAnchor, rootKey) {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ErrRootZoneNotTrusted
+}
+
+// keysMatch compares two DNSKEY records for equality
+func keysMatch(a, b *dns.DNSKEY) bool {
+	return a.Flags == b.Flags &&
+		a.Protocol == b.Protocol &&
+		a.Algorithm == b.Algorithm &&
+		a.PublicKey == b.PublicKey
+}
diff --git a/trustanchor_test.go b/trustanchor_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40df9ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/trustanchor_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+package goresolver
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+)
+
+func TestNewTrustAnchor(t *testing.T) {
+	ta, err := NewTrustAnchor()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewTrustAnchor failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if ta == nil {
+		t.Fatal("NewTrustAnchor returned nil")
+	}
+	if len(ta.dnskeys) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("NewTrustAnchor should have at least one trust anchor")
+	}
+
+	// Verify that KSK-2017 (key tag 20326) is present
+	foundKSK := false
+	for _, key := range ta.dnskeys {
+		if key.KeyTag() == 20326 {
+			foundKSK = true
+			// Verify it's a KSK (Key Signing Key)
+			if key.Flags != 257 {
+				t.Errorf("Expected KSK flag 257, got %d", key.Flags)
+			}
+			// Verify algorithm is RSA/SHA-256 (8)
+			if key.Algorithm != 8 {
+				t.Errorf("Expected algorithm 8, got %d", key.Algorithm)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !foundKSK {
+		t.Error("KSK-2017 (key tag 20326) not found in trust anchors")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifyRootZone_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+	ta, err := NewTrustAnchor()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewTrustAnchor failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Create a mock root zone with the correct KSK
+	rootZone := &SignedZone{
+		zone:         ".",
+		dnskey:       &RRSet{rrSet: []dns.RR{ta.dnskeys[0]}},
+		ds:           &RRSet{},
+		pubKeyLookup: make(map[uint16]*dns.DNSKEY),
+	}
+	
+	// Add the trust anchor key to the root zone
+	for _, key := range ta.dnskeys {
+		rootZone.addPubKey(key)
+	}
+
+	err = ta.VerifyRootZone(*rootZone)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyRootZone should succeed with matching trust anchor, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifyRootZone_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
+	ta, err := NewTrustAnchor()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewTrustAnchor failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Create a fake DNSKEY
+	fakeKey := &dns.DNSKEY{
+		Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
+			Name:   ".",
+			Rrtype: dns.TypeDNSKEY,
+			Class:  dns.ClassINET,
+		},
+		Flags:     257,
+		Protocol:  3,
+		Algorithm: 8,
+		PublicKey: "FakeKeyDataThatDoesNotMatchTrustAnchor==",
+	}
+
+	// Create a mock root zone with a different (wrong) key
+	rootZone := &SignedZone{
+		zone:         ".",
+		dnskey:       &RRSet{rrSet: []dns.RR{fakeKey}},
+		ds:           &RRSet{},
+		pubKeyLookup: make(map[uint16]*dns.DNSKEY),
+	}
+	rootZone.addPubKey(fakeKey)
+
+	err = ta.VerifyRootZone(*rootZone)
+	if err != ErrRootZoneNotTrusted {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyRootZone should fail with wrong key, expected ErrRootZoneNotTrusted, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifyRootZone_NotRootZone(t *testing.T) {
+	ta, err := NewTrustAnchor()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewTrustAnchor failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Try to verify a non-root zone
+	zone := &SignedZone{
+		zone:         "example.com.",
+		dnskey:       &RRSet{},
+		ds:           &RRSet{},
+		pubKeyLookup: make(map[uint16]*dns.DNSKEY),
+	}
+	
+	err = ta.VerifyRootZone(*zone)
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != "not a root zone" {
+		t.Errorf("VerifyRootZone should fail for non-root zone, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKeysMatch(t *testing.T) {
+	key1 := &dns.DNSKEY{
+		Flags:     257,
+		Protocol:  3,
+		Algorithm: 8,
+		PublicKey: "TestKeyData",
+	}
+	
+	key2 := &dns.DNSKEY{
+		Flags:     257,
+		Protocol:  3,
+		Algorithm: 8,
+		PublicKey: "TestKeyData",
+	}
+	
+	key3 := &dns.DNSKEY{
+		Flags:     257,
+		Protocol:  3,
+		Algorithm: 8,
+		PublicKey: "DifferentKeyData",
+	}
+
+	if !keysMatch(key1, key2) {
+		t.Error("keysMatch should return true for identical keys")
+	}
+	
+	if keysMatch(key1, key3) {
+		t.Error("keysMatch should return false for different keys")
+	}
+}