[PA-6132] : Applied CVE patch to openssl-1.1.1

Following Patches were applied:
1. CVE-2023-5678
2. CVE-2024-0727

configs/components/openssl-1.1.1.rb

@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@
     end
   end
 
+  pkg.apply_patch 'resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2023-5678.patch'
+  pkg.apply_patch 'resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-0727.patch'
+
   ####################
   # BUILD REQUIREMENTS
   ####################

resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2023-5678.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From db925ae2e65d0d925adef429afc37f75bd1c2017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
+
+We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
+DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
+
+This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
+
+It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
+differ.  DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
+sets a flag for the excessively sized Q.  This behaviour is mimicked in
+DH_check_pub_key().
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <[email protected]>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
+
+(cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  3 ++-
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
+ include/crypto/dherr.h  |  2 +-
+ include/openssl/dh.h    |  6 +++---
+ include/openssl/dherr.h |  3 ++-
+ 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -201,6 +201,19 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
++        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        goto out;
++    }
++
+     tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+     if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
+         goto err;
+@@ -219,6 +232,7 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const
+             *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+     }
+
++ out:
+     ok = 1;
+  err:
+     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reas
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+     "parameter encoding error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
+     "unable to check generator"},
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+         return 0;
+     }
+
++    if (dh->q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -180,6 +186,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
+         goto err;
+     }
+
++    if (dh->q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -2110,6 +2110,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters
+ DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
+ DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
+ DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
++DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
+ DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
+ DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
+ DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -71,14 +71,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
+ # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+
+-/* DH_check error codes */
++/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
+ # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+ # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+ # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
++# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
++# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL            0x80
++# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            100
+ #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+ #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
++#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
+ #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+ #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
+

resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-0727.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 09df4395b5071217b76dc7d3d2e630eb8c5a79c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 11:28:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add NULL checks where ContentInfo data can be NULL
+
+PKCS12 structures contain PKCS7 ContentInfo fields. These fields are
+optional and can be NULL even if the "type" is a valid value. OpenSSL
+was not properly accounting for this and a NULL dereference can occur
+causing a crash.
+
+CVE-2024-0727
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23362)
+
+(cherry picked from commit d135eeab8a5dbf72b3da5240bab9ddb7678dbd2c)
+---
+ crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c  | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c |  5 +++++
+ crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c |  5 +++--
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c  |  7 +++++--
+ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,13 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_
+                   PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA,
++                  PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
+ }
+
+@@ -132,6 +139,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_
+ {
+     if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
+         return NULL;
++
++    if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+                                    ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+                                    pass, passlen,
+@@ -159,6 +172,13 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes
+                   PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES,
++                  PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
+                             ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
+ }
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, c
+         return 0;
+     }
+
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
+     saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
+     if (!p12->mac->iter)
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+@@ -78,8 +78,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, cons
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+         } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
+-            if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+-                         &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
++            if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
++                    || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
++                                &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+                 goto err;
+         } else {
+             continue;
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+@@ -30,10 +30,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p
+ {
+     STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs;
+     int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+-    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
++    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
++        if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
++            return 0;
+         mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+-    else
++    } else {
+         mdalgs = NULL;
++    }
+
+     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
+