refactor(cli): cover experimental and small families with effect lint (CLI-2412)
#383
Workflow file for this run
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| name: AI Review | |
| # One-shot AI code review: replaces the Codex GitHub App's automatic per-push reviews with a | |
| # single exhaustive pass that runs at most once per PR. See .github/ai-review/README.md for the | |
| # full design and security model. | |
| # | |
| # Triggered by workflow_dispatch (testing/ad-hoc), an internal maintainer commenting | |
| # `/ai-review`, or automatically when a PR opens or leaves draft — resolve.ts gates the automatic | |
| # path to PR authors with write access; external contributors go through the manual path instead. | |
| on: | |
| workflow_dispatch: | |
| inputs: | |
| pr: | |
| description: "PR number to review" | |
| required: true | |
| type: string | |
| issue_comment: | |
| types: | |
| - created | |
| pull_request: | |
| types: | |
| - opened | |
| - ready_for_review | |
| permissions: {} | |
| # One source of truth for the model names; resolve, claude-review, codex-review, and | |
| # post-review's footer all read these instead of hardcoding them separately. | |
| env: | |
| CLAUDE_MODEL: claude-opus-5 | |
| CODEX_MODEL: gpt-5.6-sol | |
| # Non-command issue_comment events fire for every comment on every PR, so grouping by PR number | |
| # alone would let any comment cancel an in-flight review; give those runs their own per-run | |
| # group instead. The command check is exact equality (mirroring resolve.ts), so a near-miss like | |
| # `/ai-reviewers` can't land in the shared group and cancel a real review. | |
| # | |
| # `pull_request` events get a separate per-PR `auto` group from the manual `review` group, since | |
| # an auto event may resolve to a skip and would otherwise cancel an in-flight maintainer-requested | |
| # review without replacing it. An auto and manual run can overlap on the same PR as a result — | |
| # rare, and self-healing since the later post supersedes the earlier one. | |
| concurrency: | |
| group: >- | |
| ai-review-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number || inputs.pr }}-${{ | |
| (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && github.event.comment.body != '/ai-review') | |
| && github.run_id | |
| || (github.event_name == 'pull_request' && 'auto' || 'review') }} | |
| cancel-in-progress: true | |
| jobs: | |
| resolve: | |
| name: Resolve | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| timeout-minutes: 5 | |
| # Only PR comments starting with /ai-review, from an association that could plausibly be a | |
| # maintainer, reach this job — a cheap, non-authoritative pre-filter (it can't see a private | |
| # org member's real permission, so it can under-admit). The authoritative checks — exact | |
| # command match and effective-permission lookup — happen in resolve.ts. | |
| if: > | |
| github.event_name != 'issue_comment' || | |
| (github.event.issue.pull_request != null && | |
| startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/ai-review') && | |
| contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) | |
| # Reacts 👀 to the triggering comment (pull-requests: write) but runs only trusted, | |
| # default-branch code (see the pinned checkout ref below), never a PR's own — safe to grant write. | |
| permissions: | |
| pull-requests: write | |
| contents: read | |
| outputs: | |
| should_run: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.should_run }} | |
| pr_number: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.pr_number }} | |
| head_ref: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.head_ref }} | |
| trigger: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.trigger }} | |
| steps: | |
| # Pinned to the default ref explicitly — this job must keep running only trusted repo code, | |
| # even though the pull_request trigger above hands it PR-authored event payloads. | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0 | |
| with: | |
| bun-version-file: ".bun-version" | |
| - name: Resolve | |
| id: resolve | |
| env: | |
| GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | |
| GITHUB_REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }} | |
| EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }} | |
| PR_NUMBER: ${{ inputs.pr || github.event.issue.number || github.event.pull_request.number }} | |
| COMMENT_ID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }} | |
| COMMENT_AUTHOR_LOGIN: ${{ github.event.comment.user.login }} | |
| COMMENT_AUTHOR_ASSOCIATION: ${{ github.event.comment.author_association }} | |
| COMMENT_BODY: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} | |
| run: bun .github/scripts/ai-review/resolve.ts | |
| claude-review: | |
| name: Claude review | |
| needs: resolve | |
| if: needs.resolve.outputs.should_run == 'true' | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| timeout-minutes: 60 | |
| # Security-critical: this job checks out the PR's own head commit as untrusted review subject | |
| # matter only — nothing it executes may come from that checkout. Prompts, the findings schema, | |
| # and the validation script are all read from a separate trusted default-branch checkout | |
| # (`path: trusted` below). The job holds no write permissions, a read-only Claude tool | |
| # allowlist (no write/edit tools, no Bash), and no secrets beyond ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: read | |
| steps: | |
| - name: Checkout PR head (untrusted; review subject matter only) | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.head_ref }} | |
| path: pr | |
| fetch-depth: 1 | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - name: Checkout default branch (trusted; everything we execute comes from here) | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} | |
| path: trusted | |
| fetch-depth: 0 | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0 | |
| with: | |
| # The PR head's own `.bun-version` is untrusted — it could select a | |
| # canary/malicious toolchain — so read it from the trusted checkout. | |
| bun-version-file: "trusted/.bun-version" | |
| # This run's cache scope is the default branch; an untrusted run | |
| # must never be able to write to it. | |
| no-cache: true | |
| - name: Generate PR diff and fetch metadata | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| env: | |
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} | |
| PR: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.pr_number }} | |
| run: | | |
| mkdir -p /tmp/ai-review | |
| gh pr view "$PR" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \ | |
| --json number,title,body,baseRefName,headRefName,additions,deletions,changedFiles \ | |
| > /tmp/ai-review/pr.json | |
| base_ref=$(jq -r '.baseRefName' /tmp/ai-review/pr.json) | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/generate-pr-diff.ts "$PR" "$base_ref" | |
| # Pin the exact published version so a Claude Code release can't silently change review | |
| # behavior mid-rollout. Installed from the trusted checkout with npm config isolation so a | |
| # PR-supplied `.npmrc` in the untrusted `pr` checkout can never redirect this install to a | |
| # hostile registry. | |
| - name: Install Claude Code CLI | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| run: | | |
| # Isolate npm config with two DISTINCT empty paths — npm rejects the | |
| # same path for --userconfig and --globalconfig ("double-loading | |
| # config '/dev/null'"). These paths don't exist, so npm uses empty | |
| # user/global config; running from `trusted/` already avoids the | |
| # untrusted `pr` checkout's project `.npmrc`. | |
| npm install -g \ | |
| --userconfig "${RUNNER_TEMP}/ai-review-npmrc-user" \ | |
| --globalconfig "${RUNNER_TEMP}/ai-review-npmrc-global" \ | |
| --registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/ @anthropic-ai/claude-code@2.1.247 | |
| # Security-critical invariant: PR code is only ever read by `claude`, in the `pr`-cwd | |
| # subshell below — no other command in this job, including any `bun` call, runs with a cwd | |
| # inside `pr`. `bun` auto-loads `bunfig.toml` (arbitrary `preload` code) and `.env` from its | |
| # cwd, so a `pr`-cwd `bun` call would let a PR-authored `bunfig.toml` execute in a step | |
| # holding `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`. `claude` is a standalone binary unaffected by `bunfig.toml`; | |
| # `--bare` disables hooks/MCP/CLAUDE.md, and `--strict-mcp-config` guards against a future | |
| # CLI regression. | |
| - name: Run Claude review | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| env: | |
| ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }} | |
| run: | | |
| # GitHub launches this with `bash -e`; the retry loop below inspects | |
| # exit codes manually (a non-zero `claude` is expected and retried), | |
| # so errexit must be OFF — otherwise the failing subshell aborts the | |
| # step before cli_exit/is_error are checked and the retry never runs. | |
| set +e -uo pipefail | |
| success=false | |
| for attempt in 1 2; do | |
| ( | |
| cd "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/pr" && | |
| claude --bare --strict-mcp-config -p "$(cat "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/trusted/.github/ai-review/claude-review-prompt.md")" \ | |
| --model "$CLAUDE_MODEL" \ | |
| --output-format json \ | |
| --json-schema "$(jq -c 'del(.["$schema"])' "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/trusted/.github/ai-review/findings.schema.json")" \ | |
| --allowedTools "Read,Grep,Glob" \ | |
| --max-turns 200 | |
| ) > /tmp/ai-review/claude-raw.json | |
| cli_exit=$? | |
| # `--json-schema` makes the CLI populate `.structured_output` on a | |
| # genuine success; it stays null on a hard failure such as | |
| # `error_max_turns` — a truncated max-turns response shouldn't be | |
| # trusted just because some text happens to end up in `.result`, | |
| # so there's no `.result`-parsing fallback here. | |
| is_error="true" | |
| structured_output_is_null="true" | |
| if [ "$cli_exit" -eq 0 ]; then | |
| is_error=$(jq -r '.is_error == true' /tmp/ai-review/claude-raw.json 2>/dev/null || echo "true") | |
| structured_output_is_null=$(jq -r '.structured_output == null' /tmp/ai-review/claude-raw.json 2>/dev/null || echo "true") | |
| fi | |
| if [ "$cli_exit" -eq 0 ] && [ "$is_error" = "false" ] && [ "$structured_output_is_null" = "false" ] && | |
| jq -c '.structured_output' /tmp/ai-review/claude-raw.json > /tmp/ai-review/claude-findings.json 2>/dev/null && | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts validate-findings /tmp/ai-review/claude-findings.json | |
| then | |
| success=true | |
| break | |
| fi | |
| echo "Claude review attempt $attempt failed (cli_exit=$cli_exit, is_error=$is_error, structured_output_null=$structured_output_is_null); retrying..." >&2 | |
| done | |
| if [ "$success" != "true" ]; then | |
| echo "::error ::Claude review failed after 2 attempts." >&2 | |
| exit 1 | |
| fi | |
| # Scrubs any secret-shaped substring a prompt-injected model might have echoed back before | |
| # the raw JSON is uploaded as a public-repo artifact; the posted review is scrubbed | |
| # separately at render time. Runs with `if: always()` so a partial `claude-raw.json` from a | |
| # failed attempt is still scrubbed before the always-on upload step. | |
| - name: Redact secrets from Claude findings | |
| if: always() | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| run: | | |
| for f in /tmp/ai-review/claude-findings.json /tmp/ai-review/claude-raw.json; do | |
| if [ -f "$f" ]; then | |
| # Delete the file if redaction fails, so the always-on upload | |
| # below can never publish an unscrubbed artifact. | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts redact "$f" || { rm -f "$f"; exit 1; } | |
| fi | |
| done | |
| - name: Upload Claude findings | |
| if: always() | |
| uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: claude-findings | |
| path: | | |
| /tmp/ai-review/claude-findings.json | |
| /tmp/ai-review/claude-raw.json | |
| retention-days: 3 | |
| codex-review: | |
| name: Codex review | |
| needs: resolve | |
| if: needs.resolve.outputs.should_run == 'true' | |
| # Codex's independent review doesn't depend on claude-review, so it runs in parallel. It | |
| # works purely from /tmp/ai-review/pr.diff, so it needs only the trusted default-branch | |
| # checkout — no PR-head checkout. The verify-by-reading step (which needs the PR's files) is | |
| # the separate `adjudicate` job below. | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: read | |
| timeout-minutes: 45 | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| steps: | |
| - name: Checkout default branch (trusted; the only checkout this job needs) | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} | |
| fetch-depth: 0 | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0 | |
| with: | |
| bun-version-file: ".bun-version" | |
| no-cache: true | |
| - name: Generate PR diff | |
| env: | |
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} | |
| PR: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.pr_number }} | |
| run: | | |
| mkdir -p /tmp/ai-review | |
| base_ref=$(gh pr view "$PR" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json baseRefName --jq '.baseRefName') | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/generate-pr-diff.ts "$PR" "$base_ref" | |
| - name: Prepare findings output schema | |
| run: | | |
| mkdir -p /tmp/ai-review | |
| jq 'del(.["$schema"])' .github/ai-review/findings.schema.json > /tmp/ai-review/findings.schema.json | |
| # Safety strategy (drop-sudo + read-only) — see the "Run Codex adjudication" step below for | |
| # the full rationale (verified against the pinned openai/codex-action's action.yml + | |
| # src/runCodexExec.ts). In short: non-sudo user, no filesystem writes, no network. | |
| - name: Run Codex independent review | |
| # Pinned to v1.11 (52fe01ec…), not v1.12 (86365089…): v1.12 has two open upstream | |
| # regressions on this workflow's config (safety-strategy: drop-sudo, sandbox: read-only, | |
| # output-schema-file) — openai/codex-action#151 (a lingering descendant process keeps the | |
| # step alive after Codex already wrote its output) and openai/codex-action#160 | |
| # (drop-sudo's rewrite chmods root-owned /run sockets, breaking systemd-resolved and | |
| # killing the job regardless of timeout-minutes). A dependabot.yml ignore entry for | |
| # openai/codex-action stops an automated bump from silently regressing this pin; | |
| # re-verify both issues are closed before ever re-bumping it. | |
| uses: &codex-action-pin openai/codex-action@52fe01ec70a42f454c9d2ebd47598f9fd6893d56 # v1.11 | |
| with: | |
| openai-api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }} | |
| prompt-file: .github/ai-review/codex-review-prompt.md | |
| model: ${{ env.CODEX_MODEL }} | |
| effort: high | |
| output-schema-file: /tmp/ai-review/findings.schema.json | |
| output-file: /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json | |
| codex-version: "0.150.1" | |
| working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }} | |
| safety-strategy: drop-sudo | |
| sandbox: read-only | |
| - name: Validate Codex findings | |
| run: bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts validate-findings /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json | |
| # Same defense-in-depth as claude-review's redact step: scrub any | |
| # secret-shaped substring out of the findings before they're uploaded as | |
| # a (public-repo) artifact. | |
| - name: Redact secrets from Codex findings | |
| if: always() | |
| run: | | |
| if [ -f /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json ]; then | |
| # Delete on redaction failure so the always-on upload can't publish | |
| # an unscrubbed artifact. | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts redact /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json \ | |
| || { rm -f /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json; exit 1; } | |
| fi | |
| - name: Upload Codex findings | |
| if: always() | |
| uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: codex-findings | |
| path: /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json | |
| retention-days: 3 | |
| adjudicate: | |
| name: Adjudicate reviews | |
| needs: | |
| - resolve | |
| - claude-review | |
| - codex-review | |
| # Runs when at least one independent review succeeded — a single flaky model job must not | |
| # sink the whole review. Findings download steps are guarded per job result, and staging | |
| # substitutes an empty findings set for any review that didn't complete. | |
| if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.resolve.outputs.should_run == 'true' && (needs.claude-review.result == 'success' || needs.codex-review.result == 'success') }} | |
| # Security-critical: this job checks out the PR head (untrusted subject matter) so Codex can | |
| # verify findings by reading the real files. Codex's working directory is the workspace root, | |
| # which holds only `pr/` and `trusted/` (no AGENTS.md/config of its own); it reads `pr/` | |
| # read-only, and the adjudicate prompt's injection guard treats every file under `pr/` | |
| # (including any AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md) as untrusted data. Every `bun` invocation runs from | |
| # `trusted/`. A prompt-injected Codex here is bounded to review content: read-only sandbox, | |
| # no network, key proxied by the action, and secret-scrubbed output. | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: read | |
| timeout-minutes: 45 | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| steps: | |
| - name: Checkout PR head (untrusted; read-only, for verify-by-reading) | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.head_ref }} | |
| path: pr | |
| fetch-depth: 1 | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - name: Checkout default branch (trusted; everything we execute comes from here) | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} | |
| path: trusted | |
| fetch-depth: 0 | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0 | |
| with: | |
| # The PR head's own `.bun-version` is untrusted; read it from trusted. | |
| bun-version-file: "trusted/.bun-version" | |
| no-cache: true | |
| - name: Download Claude findings | |
| if: needs.claude-review.result == 'success' | |
| uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: claude-findings | |
| path: ${{ runner.temp }}/claude-in | |
| - name: Download Codex findings | |
| if: needs.codex-review.result == 'success' | |
| uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: codex-findings | |
| path: ${{ runner.temp }}/codex-in | |
| - name: Stage findings | |
| run: | | |
| mkdir -p /tmp/ai-review | |
| # Copy only the expected filenames rather than trusting the zips' own | |
| # entry paths (artifacts are, in principle, upstream-influenced). If a | |
| # review job didn't complete, substitute an empty findings set so the | |
| # adjudicator always has both files and simply reconciles the one that | |
| # did run. | |
| claude_src="${{ runner.temp }}/claude-in/claude-findings.json" | |
| codex_src="${{ runner.temp }}/codex-in/codex-findings.json" | |
| if [ -f "$claude_src" ]; then | |
| cp "$claude_src" /tmp/ai-review/claude-findings.json | |
| else | |
| echo '{"summary":"Claude review did not complete for this run.","findings":[]}' \ | |
| > /tmp/ai-review/claude-findings.json | |
| fi | |
| if [ -f "$codex_src" ]; then | |
| cp "$codex_src" /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json | |
| else | |
| echo '{"summary":"Codex review did not complete for this run.","findings":[]}' \ | |
| > /tmp/ai-review/codex-findings.json | |
| fi | |
| - name: Generate PR diff | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| env: | |
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} | |
| PR: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.pr_number }} | |
| run: | | |
| mkdir -p /tmp/ai-review | |
| base_ref=$(gh pr view "$PR" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json baseRefName --jq '.baseRefName') | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/generate-pr-diff.ts "$PR" "$base_ref" | |
| - name: Prepare merged-review output schema | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| run: | | |
| mkdir -p /tmp/ai-review | |
| jq 'del(.["$schema"])' .github/ai-review/merged-review.schema.json > /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.schema.json | |
| # Safety strategy, per the pinned openai/codex-action's action.yml + src/runCodexExec.ts: | |
| # - `safety-strategy: read-only` forces the legacy sandbox read-only, but Codex still | |
| # runs as the action's default sudo-capable user — the action's own docs call this | |
| # unsafe, since a sudo-capable process can read secrets like OPENAI_API_KEY out of | |
| # memory even under a read-only, no-network sandbox. | |
| # - `safety-strategy: drop-sudo` (the action's default) removes sudo from the user | |
| # running Codex but says nothing on its own about the filesystem/network sandbox. | |
| # - The action only forces its legacy read-only sandbox when `safety-strategy === | |
| # "read-only"`; otherwise it honors a separately-set `sandbox` input as-is. Setting | |
| # `safety-strategy: drop-sudo` and `sandbox: read-only` together composes them safely: | |
| # non-sudo user, no filesystem writes, no network. | |
| # `working-directory` is the workspace root so Codex's cwd holds no untrusted AGENTS.md/ | |
| # config; it reads the PR from `pr/` and executes nothing from it. | |
| - name: Run Codex adjudication | |
| # Same v1.11 pin as codex-review's step above (see its comment for the full rationale); | |
| # YAML-aliased so the SHA only needs to change in one place. | |
| uses: *codex-action-pin | |
| with: | |
| openai-api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }} | |
| prompt-file: trusted/.github/ai-review/adjudicate-prompt.md | |
| model: ${{ env.CODEX_MODEL }} | |
| effort: high | |
| output-schema-file: /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.schema.json | |
| output-file: /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json | |
| codex-version: "0.150.1" | |
| working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }} | |
| safety-strategy: drop-sudo | |
| sandbox: read-only | |
| - name: Validate merged review | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| run: bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts validate-merged /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json | |
| - name: Redact secrets from merged review | |
| if: always() | |
| working-directory: trusted | |
| run: | | |
| if [ -f /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json ]; then | |
| # Delete on redaction failure so the always-on upload can't publish | |
| # an unscrubbed artifact. | |
| bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts redact /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json \ | |
| || { rm -f /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json; exit 1; } | |
| fi | |
| - name: Upload merged review | |
| if: always() | |
| uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: merged-review | |
| path: /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json | |
| retention-days: 3 | |
| post-review: | |
| name: Post review | |
| needs: | |
| - resolve | |
| - adjudicate | |
| # Runs only when adjudication succeeded (it produced the merged review this job posts). | |
| # `!cancelled()` is required since an explicit `if` replaces the default "all needed jobs | |
| # succeeded" check. | |
| if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.resolve.outputs.should_run == 'true' && needs.adjudicate.result == 'success' }} | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| timeout-minutes: 10 | |
| permissions: | |
| pull-requests: write | |
| steps: | |
| # Security-critical: this is the only job with write permission, so it must only ever | |
| # execute trusted base-branch code — never the PR head. Checking out `develop` explicitly | |
| # (never `needs.resolve.outputs.head_ref`) keeps a malicious PR from smuggling a script | |
| # change into the one job that can write back to the PR. (For `pull_request` events GitHub | |
| # runs the workflow file from the PR's own ref; acceptable since the auto path only admits | |
| # same-repo PRs, whose authors hold write access anyway, and fork PRs run with a read-only | |
| # token and no secrets.) | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| ref: develop | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0 | |
| with: | |
| bun-version-file: ".bun-version" | |
| - name: Download merged review | |
| uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: merged-review | |
| path: /tmp/ai-review | |
| - name: Post review | |
| env: | |
| GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | |
| GITHUB_REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }} | |
| PR_NUMBER: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.pr_number }} | |
| MERGED_REVIEW_PATH: /tmp/ai-review/merged-review.json | |
| TRIGGER: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.trigger }} | |
| RUN_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }} | |
| # CLAUDE_MODEL / CODEX_MODEL are inherited from the workflow-level `env:` block above, | |
| # so the footer never drifts from what actually ran. | |
| run: bun .github/scripts/ai-review/post-review.ts post |