strategic: CryptoPolicy CRD — Post-Quantum Cryptography for NTN (NIST FIPS 203/204/205 + GSMA PQ.07)

[thc1006]

Summary

Introduce CryptoPolicy CRD: declarative Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) policy for NTN slices, conforming to NIST FIPS 203 / 204 / 205 and aligned with GSMA PQ.07 ("Post-Quantum Cryptography for Non-Terrestrial Networks"). This is the only Tier-S CRD in our backlog with no existing open-source or commercial competitor — genuine first-mover opportunity.

Why file now

• NIST PQC standards FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) / 204 (ML-DSA) / 205 (SLH-DSA) finalized August 2024.
• HQC selected by NIST (2025) as additional KEM standard; finalization expected 2026/2027.
• First post-quantum certificates expected commercially 2026 (not yet default-enabled — adoption window is opening now).
• GSMA PQ.07 published as NTN-specific guidance; treats satellite as the highest-risk PQC migration domain due to 15-20 year on-orbit lifetimes (harvest-now-decrypt-later attack vector is most acute here).
• No public K8s operator implements NTN PQC policy. Verified across 5+ industry sources (May 2026 scan): commercial vendors ship PQC IP, none ship NTN-specific K8s policy enforcement.

Proposed scope (no code)

1. ADR docs/adr/crypto-policy-design.md:
   • CRD shape: target slice selector, algorithms (kem = ML-KEM-512/768/1024, signature = ML-DSA-44/65/87 or SLH-DSA), hybridScheme (classical + PQC), keyRotation (interval days, on-demand triggers), legacyDeprecation (RSA / ECDSA cutoff dates).
   • Interaction with regenerative payload (gNB on-satellite means key material lives on-orbit — boot-time provisioning model needed).
   • Hybrid mode rationale (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 for migration window; transition policy).
2. Field-by-field mapping to:
   • 3GPP TS 33.501 (5G security architecture — NAS / RRC / UP security)
   • GSMA FS.31 baseline security + PQ.07 NTN-specific guidance
   • IETF Hybrid PQC drafts (current as of May 2026)
3. First "provider" target: BoringSSL / OpenSSL 3.x with PQC providers (oqs-provider), applied at SBI/RAN interfaces.
4. Telemetry: per-slice PQC adoption ratio, key-rotation events, hybrid-vs-pure mode breakdown.

Open questions

• Where in the NTN stack does the policy land — 5GC (SBI), gNB (Xn/F1), satellite ISL, UE-RAN, or all four? Probably layered enforcement.
• Algorithm agility for HQC arrival (2026/2027): hot-swap path? CRD must allow algorithm set to evolve without CR rewrite.
• Performance impact on regenerative payload onboard CPU budgets: ML-DSA signatures are ~20× larger than RSA-2048; satellite link-budget impact on Xn over OISL.
• Key custody on satellite vs. ground: satellites have weak physical security; ground-anchored key material with on-orbit ephemeral derivation?

Why this matters — impact: Strategic, high; unique market position

• Work effort: Large (research + ADR + CRD + reference policy enforcer + interop with regenerative payload).
• Priority: High in 18-month horizon — first-mover advantage erodes once commercial vendors ship; lead time to harden against harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks is shrinking. 15-year-lifetime satellites launched in 2026 will still be flying in 2041, well into the practical-quantum era.

References

Standards

• NIST PQC project: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
• NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) / FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) / FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), August 2024
• GSMA PQ.07 Post-Quantum Cryptography for NTN: https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-impact/technologies/security/gsma_resources/post-quantum-cryptography-for-non-terrestrial-networks-pq-07/
• NCCoE PQC migration guidance: https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/applied-cryptography/migration-to-pqc
• 3GPP TS 33.501 (Rel-19) §6 NAS / RRC / UP security

Background

• NIST first PQC standards announcement (Cloudflare commentary): https://blog.cloudflare.com/nists-first-post-quantum-standards/
• Palo Alto PQC standards guide: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/pqc-standards

Cross-link: #93 (security hardening pattern), parent epic.