diff --git a/pages/launch.md b/pages/launch.md
index 895bbe2..8344b8c 100644
--- a/pages/launch.md
+++ b/pages/launch.md
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@ Bridging to Optimism is possible here: https://app.optimism.io/bridge
 
 If you're bridging from a network other than the Ethereum network, we recommend the
 following services:
-* https://stargate.finance/transfer — a multi-network bridge for stable
-   coins
+* https://stargate.finance/transfer — a multi-network bridge for stablecoins
 * https://www.bungee.exchange — an aggregator that shows the best
    available bridging options. Use their _Refuel_ service to deposit smaller
    amounts in case you run out of `$ETH` to pay transaction fees.
@@ -132,5 +131,5 @@ Velodrome will launch with initial distribution of 400M VELO airdropped to
 DeFi community members, protocols, and DAOs likeliest to play an active role in the Optimism
 ecosystem.
 
-Details of the initial distribution and token emissinos are available in the
+Details of the initial distribution and token emissions are available in the
 [Initial Distribution section of the Tokenomics](/tokenomics#initial-distribution).
diff --git a/pages/protocol.md b/pages/protocol.md
index dd693c0..8edf1e0 100644
--- a/pages/protocol.md
+++ b/pages/protocol.md
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Solidly had several key issues that prevented its success in the Fantom ecosyste
   External bribes, however, are rewarded _per epoch_ rather than streamed, and are claimable only after the next epoch starts.
   This means that a bribe sent at the last minute of an epoch will accrue to all voters of that epoch, and be claimable once the epoch flips.
 
-The goal of these changes is to ensure a healthy equilibrium between voters and external bribers. Bribers are incentivized to get their bribes early in that week, as to attract early voters. They also benefit from bribing later, as to have more information on competing bribes. Voters face a similar dilemma, as voting too early means forgoing potentially lucrative bribes that come later, and voting too late means voting with a lower (`$veVELO`) balance. Note that this latter affect is especially pronounced for voters who have locked for shorter time periods (e.g. voters who have locked for weeks rather than months/years will experience larger differences in the bribes they receive from voting later vs. earlier in the epoch).
+The goal of these changes is to ensure a healthy equilibrium between voters and external bribers. Bribers are incentivized to get their bribes early in that week, as to attract early voters. They also benefit from bribing later, as to have more information on competing bribes. Voters face a similar dilemma, as voting too early means forgoing potentially lucrative bribes that come later, and voting too late means voting with a lower (`$veVELO`) balance. Note that this latter effect is especially pronounced for voters who have locked for shorter time periods (e.g. voters who have locked for weeks rather than months/years will experience larger differences in the bribes they receive from voting later vs. earlier in the epoch).
 
 ## Improvement: Ensuring Productive Gauges
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ The goal of these changes is to ensure a healthy equilibrium between voters and
 
 - Second, we removed negative voting, as we found it too zero-sum.
 - Third, we removed the LP emissions "boost" for voters. Those emissions are instead reallocated towards all LPs, regardless of veNFT ownership status, to ensure voters are able to incentivize outside liquidity.
-- Fourth, we adjusted the initial distribution to skew much heavier towards retail: the veDAO community and other sophisticated DeFi ecosystem participants. This was done to avoid an fleeting TVL race, and is implemented with both a standard MerkleClaim airdrop contract that dynamically mints VELO for eligible addresses, and a cross-chain WeVE burn contract powered by LayerZero.
+- Fourth, we adjusted the initial distribution to skew much heavier towards retail: the veDAO community and other sophisticated DeFi ecosystem participants. This was done to avoid a fleeting TVL race, and is implemented with both a standard MerkleClaim airdrop contract that dynamically mints VELO for eligible addresses, and a cross-chain WeVE burn contract powered by LayerZero.
 
 ## Improvement: White-Glove Support
 
diff --git a/pages/security.md b/pages/security.md
index e95f62e..6572dd5 100644
--- a/pages/security.md
+++ b/pages/security.md
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ As of August 2022, we've compiled a list of key differences between Velodrome's
   - **Treat external bribes differently than internal bribes (i.e. fees).**
     We split Bribe into two separate contracts, `InternalBribe` and
     `ExternalBribe`. `InternalBribe` functions essentially the same way as `Bribe`
-    did, but `ExternalBribe` ensures that rewards are eliglble to be claimed by
+    did, but `ExternalBribe` ensures that rewards are eligible to be claimed by
     any voter who votes for the underlying gauge during the epoch, instead of
     only voters who vote after the rewards are sent. `ExternalBribe` also ensures
     that rewards can only be claimed after the epoch ends.`ExternalBribe`