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fix(security): enforce read + shell guards on @-inline and custom-command expansion - #379
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…mand expansion _expand_at_refs and custom _read_ref bypassed _check_read_path, inlining ~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg and history.db into the prompt. Route both through _check_read_path (resolve-first, symlink-safe). custom _run_shell bypassed _check_shell, letting !`rm -rf /` / !`curl ..|sh` in templates execute with no approval. Check first, fail closed. Add parity tests: sensitive @-refs blocked, symlinks blocked, benign inlines still work, destructive custom shell refused without execution.
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Closes audit findings #1 + #2.
_expand_at_refs (agent.py) and _read_ref (custom_commands.py) used plain Path.read_text with no sensitive-path check, so @~/.ssh/id_rsa and history.db inlined straight into the prompt while read_file refused them. Both now route through _check_read_path (resolve-first, symlink-safe).
_run_shell (custom_commands.py) ran sh -c with no destructive-command check, so !
rm -rf // !curl ..|shin a template executed pre-prompt. Now checks _check_shell first, fail-closed.Tests: 7 new parity tests in tests/test_security.py (sensitive @-refs blocked, symlinks blocked, benign still inlines, destructive custom shell refused without execution).
Gates: 162 passed (security+custom_commands+trust+custom_command_shell), ruff + format clean, mypy clean on touched files.