Security hardening pass: credential hygiene, identifier sinks, secure RNG#92
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Project-wide scan of the high-risk surfaces (network clients, importers, local
databases, auth, operator tooling, Firestore rules) with six fixes. No
behaviour change for well-formed inputs; educational boundary untouched.
F1 app_state.dart — record ids now come from a static Random.secure()
(fallback to seeded Random only where no entropy source exists) instead of
a per-call non-cryptographic Random().
F2 fdc_p0_importer.dart — the FDC API key moves from the URL query string to
the X-Api-Key header (supported by api.data.gov/FDC), so it can no longer
leak through URLs in error messages, logs, or cache-metadata keys.
F3 source_fetch_client.dart — fetch error messages (non-HTTPS rejection, HTTP
status failures, byte-limit failures) now echo only scheme://host/path,
never the query string, as defense in depth for any credentialed URL.
F4 dailymed_p0_importer.dart / health_canada_dpd_p0_importer.dart — upstream-
derived values (SPL set ids, DPD drug codes) are URI-encoded before being
interpolated into request paths/queries, so malformed values cannot reshape
the request.
F5 cdss_database*.dart — CDSS table identifiers are validated against a strict
snake_case pattern (`requireValidCdssTableName`) before reaching dynamic
identifier sinks that cannot use parameter binding: SQL table names
(native), Firestore path segments (users/{uid}/cdss_tables/{table}/rows),
and web storage keys.
F6 cdss_database_firestore.dart — a staging row without any identifier key now
fails loudly instead of upserting every such row into one shared "null"
document (silent data loss).
Audited and found already sound (no change): HTTPS-only/no-redirect/byte-capped
fetch client streaming; Local AI adapter localhost-only endpoint enforcement
with redirects disabled; Firestore rules deny-all fallback + owner scoping +
safeId; operator token files written 0600 under build/; tool spawn calls use
fixed argv arrays; SQL rows use ? parameter binding; no credential logging.
New test/security_hardening_test.dart pins the table-name guard, the
query-string redaction (three error paths), and the X-Api-Key behaviour.
Gates: dart format clean, flutter analyze clean, flutter test 751 passed,
public:preflight 0 BLOCKER, privacy:preflight 0 blocker, git diff --check
clean. Synthetic fixtures only; no real credentials.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Project-wide bug/security scan of the high-risk surfaces — network clients,
importers, local/Firestore/web databases, auth services, operator tooling, and
Firestore rules — with six fixes applied. No behaviour change for
well-formed inputs; the educational safety boundary is untouched.
Fixes
lib/core/state/app_state.dartRandom()Random.secure()(seeded fallback only where no entropy source exists)lib/data/datasources/remote/fdc_p0_importer.dartX-Api-Keyheader (supported by api.data.gov/FDC); URL carries no querylib/data/datasources/remote/source_fetch_client.dartscheme://host/pathdailymed_p0_importer.dart,health_canada_dpd_p0_importer.dartUri.encodeComponent/Uri.encodeQueryComponentbefore interpolationlib/core/db/cdss_database*.dartusers/{uid}/cdss_tables/{table}/rows), web storage keysrequireValidCdssTableNameguard (strict snake_case) enforced in all three implementationslib/core/db/cdss_database_firestore.dart"null"document — every such row silently overwrote the previous one (data loss)StateErrorAudited and found already sound (no change needed)
HttpSourceFetchClient: HTTPS-only, redirects disabled, userInfo rejected, streaming byte cap enforced even without Content-Length.safeIdpattern on ids, admin/importer claims gating.0600underbuild/; no token values logged.spawnSynconly with fixed argv arrays (no shell interpolation).?parameter binding throughout.Tests
New
test/security_hardening_test.dart(6 cases) pins:X-Api-Keyheader (captured request asserted).Validation (all run, all green)
dart format --set-exit-if-changed .clean;flutter analyzeno issuesflutter test --concurrency=1→ 751 passednpm run public:preflight→ 0 BLOCKER;npm run privacy:preflight→ 0 blockergit diff --checkcleanEducational prototype only; synthetic fixtures; no real credentials, PHI, or
medical-meaning changes.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code