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[New Rule] AWS CloudTrail Log Evasion #4788

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@imays11 imays11 commented Jun 10, 2025

Pull Request

Issue link(s):
https://github.com/elastic/ia-trade-team/issues/616

Summary - What I changed

Identifies the evasion of cloudtrail logging for IAM actions involving policy creation, modification or attachment. When making certain policy-related API calls, an adversary may pad the associated policy document with whitespaces to trigger CloudTrail’s logging size constraints, resulting in incomplete logging where critical details about the policy are omitted. By exploiting this gap, threat actors can bypass monitoring performed through CloudTrail and can effectively obscure unauthorized changes. This rule looks for IAM API calls with the requestParameters property containing reason:”requestParameters too large” and omitted:true.

This is a known gap in AWS with no immediate remediation steps. While the size constraint issue affects additional services, IAM policy-related API calls are the only that pose a security risk which is why this rule is scoped specifically to event.provider: iam.amazonaws.com. For additional background on the evasion technique refer to Permisso's research.

Screenshot 2025-06-10 at 2 17 16 PM

How To Test

You can use the provided test script to test this rule against the following IAM policy-related API calls: PutRolePolicy, CreatePolicy, and CreatePolicyVersion.

Otherwise any IAM policy-related API call can be used so long as the target policy is padded with white spaces in order to reach the size range of 102,401 to 131,072 characters, which is when cloudtrail entries will be ommited and replaced with "requestParameters too large". The above script will create such a policy.

Identifies the evasion of cloudtrail logging for IAM actions involving policy creation, modification or attachment. When making certain policy-related API calls, an adversary may pad the associated policy document with whitespaces to trigger CloudTrail’s logging size constraints, resulting in incomplete logging where critical details about the policy are omitted. By exploiting this gap, threat actors can bypass monitoring performed through CloudTrail and can effectively obscure unauthorized changes. This rule looks for IAM API calls with the requestParameters property containing reason:”requestParameters too large” and omitted:true.

This is a known gap in AWS with no immediate remediation steps. While the size constraint issue affects additional services, IAM policy-related API calls are the only that pose a security risk which is why this rule is scoped specifically to `event.provider: iam.amazonaws.com`.  For additional background on the evasion technique refer to Permisso's [research](https://permiso.io/blog/cloudtrail-logging-evasion-where-policy-size-matters).
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Rule: New - Guidelines

These guidelines serve as a reminder set of considerations when proposing a new rule.

Documentation and Context

  • Detailed description of the rule.
  • List any new fields required in ECS/data sources.
  • Link related issues or PRs.
  • Include references.

Rule Metadata Checks

  • creation_date matches the date of creation PR initially merged.
  • min_stack_version should support the widest stack versions.
  • name and description should be descriptive and not include typos.
  • query should be inclusive, not overly exclusive, considering performance for diverse environments. Non ecs fields should be added to non-ecs-schema.json if not available in an integration.
  • min_stack_comments and min_stack_version should be included if the rule is only compatible starting from a specific stack version.
  • index pattern should be neither too specific nor too vague, ensuring it accurately matches the relevant data stream (e.g., use logs-endpoint.process-* for process data).
  • integration should align with the index. If the integration is newly introduced, ensure the manifest, schemas, and new_rule.yaml template are updated.
  • setup should include the necessary steps to configure the integration.
  • note should include any additional information (e.g. Triage and analysis investigation guides, timeline templates).
  • tags should be relevant to the threat and align/added to the EXPECTED_RULE_TAGS in the definitions.py file.
  • threat, techniques, and subtechniques should map to ATT&CK always if possible.

New BBR Rules

  • building_block_type should be included if the rule is a building block and the rule should be located in the rules_building_block folder.
  • bypass_bbr_timing should be included if adding custom lookback timing to the rule.

Testing and Validation

  • Provide evidence of testing and detecting the expected threat.
  • Check for existence of coverage to prevent duplication.

added investigation fields
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@Aegrah Aegrah left a comment

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LGTM!

]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "9ebd48ac-a0e2-430a-a219-fe072a50146b"
severity = "high"
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Potentially put in medium at first and bump to high if there truly are no FPs?

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