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[New] SOCKS Traffic from an Unusual Process #5324
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This detection correlates FortiGate's application control SOCKS events with Elastic Defend network event to identify the source process performing SOCKS traffic. Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure.
Rule: New - GuidelinesThese guidelines serve as a reminder set of considerations when proposing a new rule. Documentation and Context
Rule Metadata Checks
New BBR Rules
Testing and Validation
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Pull Request Overview
This PR introduces a new detection rule that correlates FortiGate firewall SOCKS traffic events with Elastic Defend network events to identify potentially malicious SOCKS proxy usage by unusual processes. The rule targets adversaries who use SOCKS proxies to obscure command and control communications.
Key Changes:
- Added a new EQL correlation rule that sequences FortiGate application control events with Endpoint network events
- Included comprehensive investigation guidance covering process analysis, network connection review, and incident response procedures
- Mapped the detection to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1090 (Proxy) under the Command and Control tactic
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rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_socks_fortigate_endpoint.toml
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rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_socks_fortigate_endpoint.toml
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…int.toml Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
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rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_socks_fortigate_endpoint.toml
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rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_socks_fortigate_endpoint.toml
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…int.toml Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <[email protected]>
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…int.toml Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <[email protected]>
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⛔️ Test failed Results
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This detection correlates FortiGate's application control SOCKS events with Elastic Defend network event to identify the source process performing SOCKS traffic. Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure.