perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check

It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security checks since it was first introduced by: commit da97e18 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks") so remove it. Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
linuxppc · Feb 26, 2025 · 9ec84f7 · 9ec84f7
1 parent 4632cd0
commit 9ec84f7
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Showing 11 changed files with 25 additions and 27 deletions.
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	 * to the user in a zero-copy fashion.
 	 */
 	if (event->attr.exclude_kernel) {
-		ret = perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+		ret = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	}

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -4168,7 +4168,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (x86_pmu.version < 3)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+	ret = perf_allow_cpu();
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event)
 	 * the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
 	 */
 	if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
-		v = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+		v = perf_allow_cpu();
 		if (v)
 			return v;
 	}

diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static_assert((PERF_EVENT_FLAG_ARCH & SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX) == SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_C
 
 static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel())
 		event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX;
 }
 
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	set_spe_event_has_cx(event);
 	reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
 	if (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))
-		return perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+		return perf_allow_kernel();
 
 	return 0;
 }

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, int type)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_alloc, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_read, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1672,22 +1672,22 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
 }
 
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr);
+int perf_allow_kernel(void);
 
-static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+static inline int perf_allow_cpu(void)
 {
 	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
+	return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
 }
 
-static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(void)
 {
 	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
+	return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
 }
 
 extern int perf_exclude_event(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs);

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2324,14 +2324,13 @@ struct perf_event_attr;
 struct perf_event;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-extern int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+extern int security_perf_event_open(int type);
 extern int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event);
 extern void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event);
 extern int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event);
 extern int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event);
 #else
-static inline int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr,
-					   int type)
+static inline int security_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
 	return 0;
 }

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4883,7 +4883,7 @@ find_get_context(struct task_struct *task, struct perf_event *event)
 
 	if (!task) {
 		/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
-		err = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+		err = perf_allow_cpu();
 		if (err)
 			return ERR_PTR(err);
 
@@ -12532,7 +12532,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
 		}
 		/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
 		if (mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) {
-			ret = perf_allow_kernel(attr);
+			ret = perf_allow_kernel();
 			if (ret)
 				return ret;
 		}
@@ -12789,12 +12789,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		return err;
 
 	/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
-	err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+	err = security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 	if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
-		err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+		err = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -12814,7 +12814,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
 	if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) {
-		err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+		err = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -13647,12 +13647,12 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event)
 	return &event->attr;
 }
 
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+int perf_allow_kernel(void)
 {
 	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
+	return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel);
 

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
 
 	/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
 	if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
-		ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+		ret = perf_allow_tracepoint();
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
 	 * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
 	 * only allow root to have these.
 	 */
-	ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+	ret = perf_allow_tracepoint();
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
@@ -5883,16 +5883,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
 /**
  * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed
- * @attr: perf event attribute
  * @type: type of event
  *
  * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+int security_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, type);
 }
 
 /**

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7040,7 +7040,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
 	u32 requested, sid = current_sid();