Remove fromLiteral from spec.

explainer.md

@@ -213,26 +213,6 @@ trustedTypes.createPolicy('default', {
 This mechanism complements CSP's `'unsafe-inline'`, allowing the authors to enable strong security 
 controls in their application even if it occasionally uses `javascript:` URLs for legitimate purposes. 
 
-### Source Literals
-
-XSS is an unintended modification of a site's source code. Wrapping literals
-from the original JavaScript resource - which by definition aren't XSS - can be
-cumbersome. Trusted Types provides a way to easily wrap source literals in
-Trusted Types by using the tagged template syntax and the `fromLiteral` methods,
-in a way that cannot be spoofed at runtime:
-
-``` javascript
-const value = TrustedHTML.fromLiteral`<b>Hello there.</b>`;
-```
-
-Note that template literals are passed as arrays of strings to the tag functions.
-`fromLiteral` checks that a passed-in value is actually a template literal
-and not dynamically constructed.
-
-``` javascript
-TrustedHTML.fromLiteral(["<b>Hello there.</b>"]);  // Throws.
-```
-
 ### DOM Sinks
 
 *   **HTML Contexts**: Given something like `typedef (DOMString or TrustedHTML) HTMLString`, we'd

spec/index.bs

@@ -21,15 +21,18 @@ WPT Path Prefix: /trusted-types/
 block-Document-execCommand.html
 block-Node-multiple-arguments.html
 block-string-assignment-to-attribute-via-attribute-node.html
+block-string-assignment-to-Document-parseHTMLUnsafe.html
 block-string-assignment-to-Document-write.html
 block-string-assignment-to-DOMParser-parseFromString.html
 block-string-assignment-to-DOMWindowTimers-setTimeout-setInterval.html
 block-string-assignment-to-Element-insertAdjacentHTML.html
 block-string-assignment-to-Element-outerHTML.html
 block-string-assignment-to-Element-setAttribute.html
 block-string-assignment-to-Element-setAttributeNS.html
+block-string-assignment-to-Element-setHTMLUnsafe.html
 block-string-assignment-to-HTMLElement-generic.html
 block-string-assignment-to-Range-createContextualFragment.html
+block-string-assignment-to-ShadowRoot-setHTMLUnsafe.html
 block-text-node-insertion-into-script-element.html
 csp-block-eval.html
 default-policy-callback-arguments.html
@@ -73,7 +76,6 @@ trusted-types-eval-reporting-no-unsafe-eval.html
 trusted-types-eval-reporting-report-only.html
 trusted-types-eval-reporting.html
 trusted-types-event-handlers.html
-trusted-types-from-literal.html
 trusted-types-navigation.html
 trusted-types-report-only.html
 trusted-types-reporting-check-report.html
@@ -85,7 +87,6 @@ TrustedType-AttributeNodes.html
 TrustedTypePolicy-createXXX.html
 TrustedTypePolicy-CSP-no-name.html
 TrustedTypePolicy-CSP-wildcard.html
-TrustedTypePolicyFactory-blocking.html
 TrustedTypePolicyFactory-constants.html
 TrustedTypePolicyFactory-createPolicy-createXYZTests.html
 TrustedTypePolicyFactory-createPolicy-cspTests-noNamesGiven.html
@@ -380,7 +381,6 @@ wrappers around a string, constructed via a {{TrustedTypePolicy}}'s
 interface TrustedHTML {
   stringifier;
   DOMString toJSON();
-  static TrustedHTML fromLiteral(object templateStringsArray);
 };
 </pre>
 
@@ -393,9 +393,6 @@ will never change during its lifetime.
 TrustedHTML object are to return the value from its
 `[[Data]]` internal slot.
 
-The <dfn method for="TrustedHTML">fromLiteral(object templateStringsArray)</dfn> method, when invoked, returns the result of executing a [$Create a Trusted Type from literal$] algorithm,
-with {{TrustedHTML}} as |type| and |templateStringsArray| as |template|.
-
 ### <dfn interface>TrustedScript</dfn> ### {#trusted-script}
 
 The TrustedScript interface represents a string with an uncompiled
@@ -410,7 +407,6 @@ around a string, constructed via a {{TrustedTypePolicy}}'s
 interface TrustedScript {
   stringifier;
   DOMString toJSON();
-  static TrustedScript fromLiteral(object templateStringsArray);
 };
 </pre>
 
@@ -423,9 +419,6 @@ will never change during its lifetime.
 TrustedScript object are to return the value from its
 `[[Data]]` internal slot.
 
-The <dfn method for="TrustedScript">fromLiteral(object templateStringsArray)</dfn> method, when invoked, returns the result of executing a [$Create a Trusted Type from literal$] algorithm,
-with {{TrustedScript}} as |type| and |templateStringsArray| as |template|.
-
 ### <dfn interface>TrustedScriptURL</dfn> ### {#trused-script-url}
 
 The TrustedScriptURL interface represents a string that a developer
@@ -440,7 +433,6 @@ string, constructed via a {{TrustedTypePolicy}}'s
 interface TrustedScriptURL {
   stringifier;
   USVString toJSON();
-  static TrustedScriptURL fromLiteral(object templateStringsArray);
 };
 </pre>
 
@@ -453,9 +445,6 @@ will never change during its lifetime.
 TrustedScriptURL object are to return the value from its
 `[[Data]]` internal slot.
 
-The <dfn method for="TrustedScriptURL">fromLiteral(object templateStringsArray)</dfn> method, when invoked, returns the result of executing a [$Create a Trusted Type from literal$] algorithm,
-with {{TrustedScriptURL}} as |type| and |templateStringsArray| as |template|.
-
 ## <dfn>Policies</dfn> ## {#policies-hdr}
 
 Trusted Types can only be created via user-defined
@@ -1026,29 +1015,6 @@ a string |value|, a list |arguments|, and a boolean |throwIfMissing|, execute th
     and [[ECMASCRIPT#sec-method|callback **this** value]] set to `null`, rethrowing any exceptions.
 1.  Return |policyValue|.
 
-## <dfn abstract-op>Create a Trusted Type from literal</dfn> ## {#create-a-trusted-type-from-literal-algorithm}
-
-Given a {{TrustedType}} type |type| and an object |template|, execute the following steps:
-
-1.  If [$check templatedness$] of |template| returns false, throw a {{TypeError}}.
-1.  If [$Get$](|template|, "length") is not equal to 1, throw a {{TypeError}}.
-1.  Let |templatedValue| be the result of [$Get$](|template|, 0).
-1.  If |type| is {{TrustedHTML}}, perform the following steps:
-    1.  Let |templateNode| be the results of [=create an element|creating an element=] given "template", the [=HTML namespace=] and [=current global object=]'s [=associated Document=].
-    1.  Assert: |templateNode| is {{HTMLTemplateElement}}.
-    1.  Let |fragment| be the result of invoking [$fragment parsing algorithm$], with |templatedValue| as <var ignore>markup</var>, and |templateNode| as a <var ignore>context element</var>.
-    1.  Set |templatedValue| to be the result of invoking [=HTML fragment serialization algorithm=], with |fragment| as <var ignore>the node</var>.
-
-1. Return a new instance of an interface |type|, with its `[[Data]]` internal slot value set to |templatedValue|.
-
-## Check templatedness of an object ## {#check-templatedness-algorithm}
-
-To <dfn abstract-op>check templatedness</dfn> of an object |value|, perform the following steps. They return a boolean value:
-
-1. Let |realm| be the <a>current Realm Record</a>.
-1. For each |item| of |realm|.\[[TemplateMap]], if |item|.\[[Array]] is |value|, return true.
-1. Return false.
-
 ## <dfn abstract-op>Get Trusted Type compliant string</dfn> ## {#get-trusted-type-compliant-string-algorithm}
 
 This algorithm will return a string that can be used with an
@@ -1643,8 +1609,8 @@ Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types one t
 
 <div class="example" id="header-that-allows-no-policy-names">
 An empty [=directive=] [=directive/value=] indicates policies may not be created,
-and sinks expect Trusted Type values, i.e. DOM XSS [=injection sinks=] cannot be used
-with dynamic values. Values for those sinks can only be created by <code>fromLiteral</code> tag functions.
+and sinks expect Trusted Type values, i.e. no DOM XSS [=injection sinks=] can be used
+at all.
 <pre class="http">
 Content-Security-Policy: trusted-types; require-trusted-types-for 'script'
 </pre>