w3f · FatemeShirazi · Jul 10, 2025 · Jul 23, 2025 · Jul 28, 2025 · Aug 4, 2025
diff --git a/docs/Events.md b/docs/Events.md
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+title: Events
+---
+**Conferences 2025**
+
+[CRYPTO](https://crypto.iacr.org/2025/) (August 17-21)
+
+Participants: Chen-Da Liu-Zhang, Elizabeth Crites, and Alistair Stewart
+
+[ACNS](https://acns2025.fordaysec.de/) (June 23-26)
+
+Participants: Jeff Burdges, Elizabeth Crites, Alistair Stewart, and Sergey Vasilyev
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/Polkadot-Crypto.png b/docs/Polkadot/Polkadot-Crypto.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/1-validator-selection.md b/docs/Polkadot/economics/1-validator-selection.md
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/2-parachain-theory.md b/docs/Polkadot/economics/2-parachain-theory.md
@@ -2,15 +2,17 @@
 title: Theoretical Analysis of Parachain Auctions
 ---
 
-**Authors**: Samuel Häfner and [Alistair Stewart](team_members/alistair.md)
+![](parachain-auctions.png)
 
-**Last updated**: April 17, 2021
+Polkadot uses a [candle auction format](https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/en/learn-auction) to allocate parachain slots. A candle auction is a dynamic auction mechanism characterized by a randomly ending time. Such a random-closing rule affects equilibrium behavior, particularly in scenarios where bidders have front-running opportunities.
 
-As explained [here](/Polkadot/overview/3-parachain-allocation.md) and [here](https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/en/learn-auction) Polkadot uses a candle auction format to allocate parachain slots. A candle auction is a dynamic auction with the distinguishing feature that the ending time is random. In this project, we analyze the effects of such a random-closing rule on equilibrium play when some bidders have front-running opportunities.
+Front-running opportunities can arise on blockchains when upcoming transactions become visible to network participants before they are included in new blocks. In the context of blockchain auction implementations, this allows certain bidders to observe and potentially respond to others' bids before those bids take effect, such as when they are recorded on-chain and incorporated into the auction mechanism. In first-price auctions, this enables tech-savvy bidders to outbid competitors at will. In second-price auctions, an auctioneer could increase the payment of the winning bidder at no cost by registering their own (pseudonymous) bidder.
 
-Front-running opportunities emerge on blockchains because upcoming transaction become known among the network participants before they are included in new blocks. For blockchain implementations of auctions, this means that some bidders can see and potentially react to other bidders' bids before they come into effect; i.e., are recorded on the chain and are thus taken into account by the auction mechanism. In first-price auctions, this gives tech-savvy bidders the possibility to outbid other bidders as they please. In second-price auctions, the auctioneer could raise the payment of the winning bidder at no cost by registering his own (pseudonymous) bidder.
+While cryptographic solutions to these problems exist, they are either computationally intensive or require multiple actions by the bidders. In the presence of smart contracts, such approaches fail altogether, as smart contract actions are fully predictable. 
 
-Whereas cryptographic solutions to these problems exist, they are either very computing intensive or require multiple actions by the bidders. In the presence of smart contracts, they do not work at all, because the actions of smart contracts are perfectly anticipatable. As an alternative that works without encrypting bids, this project analyzes a dynamic single-unit first-price auction with a random ending time. Time is discrete and in every round two bidders move sequentially in a fixed order.  We show that a random-closing rule both revenue-dominates a hard-closing rule and makes participation for the bidder being front-run more attractive. In particular, under a uniform ending time distribution both the utility of the disadvantaged bidder and total revenues approach that of a second-price auction as the number of rounds grows large. Furthermore, the good is allocated efficiently.
+An alternative to encrypted bidding is the use of a dynamic, single-unit first-price auction with a random ending time. Time is modeled discretely, and in each round, two bidders move sequentially in a fixed order. A random-closing rule not only revenue-dominates a hard-closing rule but also makes participation more attractive for bidders subject to front-running. In particular, under a uniform ending time distribution, both the utility of the disadvantaged bidder and the total revenue converge toward those of a second-price auction as the number of rounds increases. Furthermore, the good is allocated efficiently.
 
 Reference:
 Samuel Häfner and Alistair Stewart (2021): Blockchains, Front-Running, and Candle Auctions. Working Paper. [SSRN](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3846363)
+
+**For inquiries or questions please contact:** [Alistair Stewart](team_members/alistair.md)
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/3-parachain-experiment.md b/docs/Polkadot/economics/3-parachain-experiment.md
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/4-gamification.md b/docs/Polkadot/economics/4-gamification.md
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/5-utilitytokendesign.md b/docs/Polkadot/economics/5-utilitytokendesign.md
@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@
 title: Utility Token Design
 ---
 
-**Authors**: Samuel Häfner
+![](utility-token.png)
 
-**Last updated**: October 13, 2021
 
-**Paper Link:** [[SSRN]](http://ssrn.com/abstract=3954773)
+Utility tokens are cryptographic tokens primarily used to access and consume services offered by the token issuer. One of the objectives of this [project](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3954773) was to analyze general design principles of utility tokens native to proof-of-stake blockchains.  
 
-In this project, I analyze some general design principles of utility tokens that are native to a proof-of-stake blockchain. Utility tokens are cryptographic tokens whose main economic use is to access and consume the respective token issuer’s services. 
+The Polkadot network provides services through parachain slots, which offer shared security and interoperability with other parachains. To secure a slot, users (namely the teams building on Polkadot) must stake DOT tokens in recurring slot auctions.  
 
-The services offered by the Polkadot network consist of parachain slots, which come with shared security and means to communicate with other parachains. To obtain one of the slots, the users --- i.e., the teams building on Polkadot --- need to put forth DOTs in recurrent slot auctions.  
+The analysis required a dynamic general equilibrium model of utility tokens, which served as a medium for consuming services on a two-sided market platform.
 
-For the analysis, I set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of utility tokens that serve as a means to consume services on a two-sided market platform.
+On the one side of the platform, users derive utility from consuming the services it provides. On the other side, validators supply the necessary security and are compensated with tokens. Validators must regularly sell a portion of their tokens to cover operational costs, while users must continually purchase tokens to access services. A token market facilitates the balance between token supply and demand.
 
-On the one side of the platform, there are users that derive utility from consuming the services provided by the platform. On the other side, there are validators that provide the required security and receive tokens in return. Validators need to repeatedly sell some of their tokens to cover their costs; users need to repeatedly buy tokens to consume the services. A token market balances token supply and token demand.
+The main results of the analysis are as follows: First, utility token markets are generally efficient, as they lead to the socially optimal provision of services. Second, a key tension has been identified between the dynamics of utility token value, specifically between the evolution of the services provided and the payment mechanisms on the users’ side. 
+
+**For inquieries or questions please contact**:
 
-The main results of the analysis are the following: First, I find that utility token markets are generally efficient because they result in the socially optimal provision of services. Second, I uncover a tension between the dynamics of utility tokens' value, the evolution of the provided services, and the payment details on the users’ side. 
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/Combinatorial-candle-auction.png b/docs/Polkadot/economics/Combinatorial-candle-auction.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/Economics.png b/docs/Polkadot/economics/Economics.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/Experimental-investigations.png b/docs/Polkadot/economics/Experimental-investigations.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/collective-members.png b/docs/Polkadot/economics/collective-members.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/index.md b/docs/Polkadot/economics/index.md
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ title: Economics
 
 import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
 
-This chapter covers the economic research done at the Web3 Foundation.
+This section showcases the economic research conducted by the Web3 Foundation. The research team uses tools from microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory to analyze different aspects of the protocol.
 
-We use tools from microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory to analyze different aspects of the protocol.
+![](Economics.png)
 
 <DocCardList />
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/parachain-auctions.png b/docs/Polkadot/economics/parachain-auctions.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/utility-token.png b/docs/Polkadot/economics/utility-token.png
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/economics/validator-selection.jpeg b/docs/Polkadot/economics/validator-selection.jpeg
diff --git a/docs/Polkadot/index.md b/docs/Polkadot/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+title: Polkadot is in the house
+---
+
+import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
+
+Let us introduce Polkadot's high-level design and its architecture, including parachains functionality as well as interoperation with external blockchains. Other sections included here pertain to token economics and parachain allocation.
+
+![](Polkadot-Crypto.png)
+
+<DocCardList />