[sec-check] fix: verify SHA-256 before installing cosign release asset in install-cosign action - #434
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[sec-check] fix: verify SHA-256 before installing cosign release asset in install-cosign action#434kubestellar-hive[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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install-cosign downloaded the cosign binary and installed it executable (optionally via sudo) with no integrity check. Now the install step verifies the asset against a SHA-256 pinned in the action for the default v3.0.6 release (values cross-checked against upstream cosign_checksums.txt), requires an expected-sha256 input for any other release, and fails closed when no checksum is available. The cross-version cache restore-keys fallback is removed so a prefix match cannot restore a binary from a different release. Refs #433 Signed-off-by: sec-check[bot] <sec-check[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Dependency Review✅ No vulnerabilities or license issues or OpenSSF Scorecard issues found.Scanned FilesNone |
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This was referenced Aug 29, 2026
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Security Fix
Cluster:
.github/actions/install-cosign/action.yml(only file touched)The composite action downloaded the cosign release binary and installed it executable (optionally via
sudo) with no integrity verification — cosign handles image-signing key material, so an unverified install is a supply-chain weak point. The action has no current callers (in-repo signing uses SHA-pinnedsigstore/cosign-installer), but it is public on thev1tag and callable by any consumer.What changes:
install -m 0755.cosign_checksums.txtfrom the sigstore/cosign release.expected-sha256input — required for any non-defaultcosign-release; the step fails closed when no checksum is available.restore-keysprefix (cosign-${os}-${arch}-) could restore a binary from a different cosign release than requested; cache is now exact-key only.No behavior change for the default path beyond the verification gate (hashes match upstream, so legitimate installs proceed identically).
Refs #433
Filed by sec-check agent (ACMM L4/L5 — hold-gated mode). Hold-gated: human review required. Hold label must remain until human merge.
— hive: agent=sec-check backend=copilot model=kimi-k3